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Burying Our Constitution in the Sand? Evaluating the 
Ostrich Response to the Use of International and Foreign 
Law in U.S. Constitutional Interpretation 
 
Cindy G. Buys∗
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In the last few years, the U.S. Supreme Court has issued several 
high-profile opinions that refer to international and foreign law,1 igniting 
a heated debate among the justices, legal scholars, politicians,2 and 
commentators regarding the proper use of international and foreign law 
in Supreme Court jurisprudence. Justice Scalia, usually joined by Justice 
Thomas and Chief Justice Rehnquist, has led the fight against the use of 
foreign and, to a lesser extent, international law as a basis for 
constitutional decision-making. Justices Breyer, Ginsberg, Kennedy, 
O’Connor, Souter, Stevens, and White have asserted that international 
and foreign law have relevance to their work and that it is not 
inappropriate to refer to such sources in their decision-making.3
 ∗ Cindy G. Buys is an Assistant Professor at Southern Illinois University School of Law. The 
author would like to thank Brannon Denning, Sheila Simon, and Rebecca Vancourt for their 
invaluable assistance. 
 1. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding that executions of juveniles 
below the age of 18 constitutes cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment); 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down a Texas statute that makes it a crime for two 
persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 
306 (2003) (upholding the constitutionality of the University of Michigan Law School’s admissions 
policies with respect to diversity); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that executions 
of mentally retarded criminals constitute cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth 
Amendment). 
 2. Certain politicians who advocate against the use of such sources have introduced 
resolutions and legislation that would limit the ability of federal courts to use international or foreign 
law in their decisions. See, e.g., H.R. 446, 108th Cong. (2003); Constitution Restoration Act of 2005, 
H.R. 1070, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. Res. 97, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 3. Chief Justice Roberts’ views on the issue are still largely unknown. However, during his 
confirmation hearings before the Senate, Chief Justice Roberts did express concern “about the use of 
foreign law as precedent.” U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee Holds a Hearing on the Nomination of 
John Roberts to be the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Transcript: Day Two of the Roberts 
Confirmation Hearings, WASH POST, Sept. 13, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/09/13/AR2005091301210.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2006) [hereinafter 
Roberts]. Similarly, new Supreme Court Justice Samuel Alito stated during his confirmation 
hearings: “I don’t think that foreign law is helpful in interpreting the Constitution,” although he 
allowed that using foreign law is legitimate in other situations, such as when interpreting treaties or 
when called for by private contracts. U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on Judge Samuel 
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The debate regarding the use of foreign and international law is 
really a sub-set of the debate about the proper method of interpreting the 
U.S. Constitution. One goal of this article is to demonstrate that there are 
legitimate reasons to use these sources in constitutional interpretation in 
certain cases. In fact, use of international law sources can be reconciled 
with many classic theories of constitutional interpretation. A second goal 
is to clarify distinctions between these sources and to demonstrate how 
and why each may be used most appropriately by the Court. 
Objections to the use of international law in U.S. Supreme Court 
jurisprudence are somewhat surprising in light of the fact that 
international law has always been part of U.S. law. International law is 
expressly mentioned in the U.S. Constitution in more than one place.4 
International law acts to define the United States as a sovereign nation-
state, with all the powers associated with that status, and imposes 
responsibilities upon the use of those powers. U.S. constitutional 
concepts of individual rights together with international human rights 
law share common natural law foundations and the development of each 
has greatly influenced the development of the other. 
Both international and foreign law exercised a heavy influence on 
the Framers of the U.S. Constitution. In addition, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has referred to international and foreign sources in many cases 
throughout its history. In light of this history, it would be surprising if the 
U.S. Supreme Court did not look to international law for guidance. 
However, there remains much disagreement as to the use of international 
and foreign law in U.S. constitutional jurisprudence, particularly with 
respect to defining the scope of various individual rights. 
Despite a fairly large amount of commentary on this issue in recent 
times, the positions of the parties on both sides of this debate and the 
basis for those positions have not been fully explicated. In addition, this 
debate has been confused by the conflation of international law and 
foreign law sources and by a lack of careful distinction between various 
sources of international law.5 Furthermore, critics, including most 
Alito’s Nomination to the Supreme Court, WASH POST, Jan. 10, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost 
.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/10/AR2006011000781.html (last visited Oct.4, 2006). 
 4. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (“The Congress shall have the Power To . . . 
define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law 
of nations); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (The President “shall have the Power . . . to make 
Treaties”); U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and 
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which 
shall be made, under their Authority”); U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the 
Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which 
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land”). 
 5. For example, several newspapers recently ran an Associated Press article under a title 
which suggested the Attorney General was critical of international law, when in fact the article 
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prominently Justice Scalia, have rightly chastised the Supreme Court for 
its selective use of foreign and international law without articulating 
clearer standards regarding the circumstances under which it is 
appropriate to do so. 
Accordingly, this article seeks to analyze why, when, and how 
international and foreign law is and should be used by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in its decision-making. The article begins by distinguishing the 
two very different sources of law at issue in this debate – international 
law and foreign law. As the article demonstrates, the use of international 
law is clearly required by the U.S. Constitution in some cases, whereas 
the use of foreign law has a weaker constitutional basis. There are also 
different sources of international law—treaty law and customary 
international law—which are not always as clearly distinguished as they 
should be in the context of this debate. 
The article then briefly introduces the arguments on both sides of the 
debate and seeks to clear away some of the confusion as to what 
international and foreign law is being used and how each type is being 
used by the current Supreme Court. The article then examines the 
influence of international and foreign law on the U.S. Constitution, both 
at its inception and throughout its history. This examination demonstrates 
that the use of international law by the U.S. Supreme Court to inform its 
understanding of individual rights protected by the U.S. Constitution is 
well grounded in historical practice and the political theories, namely 
sovereignty and natural law, upon which the Constitution is based. These 
political theories recognize the responsibility of states to protect human 
rights. 
Through this examination, this article demonstrates that, not only is 
it entirely appropriate for the U.S. Supreme Court to take into account 
international law when interpreting the Constitution, the Court often has 
an obligation to do so. In fact, failing to take international law into 
account would be contrary to the Framers’ intentions, violate the social 
compact upon which the nation is formed, and could undermine the 
Supreme Court’s legitimacy. The article acknowledges and responds to 
discussed Attorney General Gonzales’s concerns with respect to the use of foreign law, not 
international law. Compare Mark Sherman, U.S. Attorney General: Justices Are Wrong to Cite 
International Law, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 19, 2005, at 4, available at http://www.law. 
com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1129626313552 with Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales, Prepared 
Remarks at George Mason University (Oct. 18, 2005) (transcript available at 
http://releases.usnewswire.com/printing.asp?id=55230). As is discussed below, foreign law and 
international law are two very different sources of law. In fact, Attorney General Gonzales himself 
drew clear distinctions between the use of international and foreign law in his recent remarks at the 
University of Chicago Law School. See Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales, Prepared Remarks at 
the University of Chicago Law School (Nov. 9, 2005) (transcript available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2005/ag_speech_0511091.html). 
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critics of the use of foreign and international law and demonstrates why 
foreign law has a weaker historical and theoretical basis in our 
democratic system and should therefore be approached with much 
greater caution. This article also suggests reasons why the Supreme 
Court should continue to take international law into account in the future. 
Finally, this article proposes some guidelines for when and how 
international and foreign law should or should not be used in U.S. 
Constitutional interpretation in the future. 
 
II.  CLARIFYING THE ISSUE 
 
Before delving into the arguments of the various parties, it is first 
necessary to clarify exactly what the debate is all about. There are two 
very different types of law at issue in this debate: international law and 
foreign law. These two very different types of law are sometimes 
conflated by commentators, which has confused the debate on this 
subject. 
International law is commonly thought to be derived from 
international treaties or conventions, customary international law, 
general principles of law, and the works of jurists and scholars.6
With respect to conventional international law, the Supremacy 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution makes treaties part of the supreme law of 
the land on par with federal statutes.7 In the United States, treaties are 
made by the President, subject to the advice and consent of two-thirds of 
the Senate.8 U.S. law recognizes a variety of different types of 
international agreements that create binding international obligations for 
the United States, including self-executing and non-self-executing 
treaties, treaties that have been signed by the President, but not yet 
 6. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, I.C.J. art. 38(1) [hereinafter ICJ]. 
 7. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2; Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888). A recent 
unobjectionable example of the use of international treaty law by a Supreme Court justice occurred 
in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), where the Supreme Court upheld the University of 
Michigan Law School’s admission policies regarding the promotion of diversity. Justice Ginsberg 
wrote a concurring opinion in which she observed that the Court’s holding “accords with the 
international understanding of the office of affirmative action.” Grutter, 539 U.S. at 344. In support 
of this statement, Justice Ginsberg cited two multilateral treaties aimed at eliminating discrimination: 
1) The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Annex 
A, G.A. Res. 2106, 20 U.N. GAOR Res. Supp. (No.14) 47, U.N. Doc. A/6014, Art. 2(2) (1965), 
which was ratified by the United States in 1994 (see State Dept., Treaties in Force 422–423 (June 
1996)), and 2) the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW), Annex, G.A. Res. 34/180, 34 U.N. GAOR Res. Supp. (No. 46) 194, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 
(1979) (the United States signed CEDAW in 1980, but the Senate has not yet given its advice and 
consent to ratification of the treaty). Justice Ginsberg thus used international treaty law that is part of 
the supreme law of the United States as further justification for the holding of the case, as well as an 
international treaty which the United States has signed, but not yet ratified. 
 8. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.2. 
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ratified, and other types of executive international agreements.9
Customary international law, defined as general state practice 
accepted as law,10 also is binding law in the United States. As Justice 
Gray of the U.S. Supreme Court famously stated more than a century 
ago: 
 
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and 
administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as 
often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for 
their determination. For this purpose, where there is no treaty, and no 
controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must 
be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations; and, as evidence 
of these, to the works of jurists and commentators, who by years of 
labor, research and experience, have made themselves peculiarly well 
acquainted with the subjects of which they treat.11
 
Thus, the Supreme Court has a duty to ascertain whether a particular 
state practice has risen to the status of a customary international law rule 
or a general principle of law12 that is binding on the United States.13 If so, 
 9. Over time, it has come to be accepted practice that the President may enter into 
international agreements which are given the same legal status as treaties, even though they are not 
subject to the advice and consent of the Senate. See, e.g., U.S. v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937). 
 10. ICJ, supra note 7, at art. 38(1)(b). 
 11. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). In fact, the concept of incorporating the 
law of nations into domestic law predated the U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., Respublica v. de 
Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111 (1784). “The Framers understood the ‘law of nations’ (which then 
was almost entirely customary practice, as opposed to treaties) to be part of the ‘law’ of the United 
States. President Washington claimed authority to execute the law of nations by executive order, e.g. 
by declaring neutrality in the 1793 war between France and Great Britain. He also issued regulations 
defining specific offenses against the law of nations which provided the governing law until 
Congress passed applicable legislation.” PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW: UNITED 
STATES FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 183 (Foundation Press 2002). See also Stewart Jay, The Status of 
the Law of Nations in Early American Law, 42 VAND. L. REV. 819, 824-28 (1989). The Executive 
Branch continues to participate in the development of customary international law today by issuing 
executive orders claiming jurisdiction over fisheries, the continental shelf, air space and the 
Exclusive Economic Zone. See TRIMBLE, supra note 12, at 183; see also infra Part V. 
 12. “[G]eneral principles of law” is another source of international law listed in the Statute of 
the International Court of Justice. ICJ, supra note 7, at art. 38(1)(c). It refers to legal principles that 
are so fundamental, they will be found in virtually every national legal system. MARK W. JANIS, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 56 (Aspen 4th ed. 2003). 
 13. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729 (2004) (“For two centuries we have 
affirmed that the domestic law of the United States recognizes the law of nations.”). See also Banco 
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964) (“[I]t is, of course, true that United States 
courts apply international law as a part of our own in appropriate circumstances.”); United States v. 
Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820) (“The common law, too, recognises [sic] and punishes piracy 
as an offence [sic], not against its own municipal code, but as an offence [sic] against the law of 
nations, (which is part of the common law,[sic]).”); The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 
(1815) (“[T]he Court is bound by the law of nations which is a part of the law of the land.”); Ware v. 
Hylton, 3 U.S.(3 Dall.)199, 281 (1796) (“When the United States declared their independence, they 
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that rule becomes part of U.S. law.14
The second category of law at issue in this debate is foreign law, 
largely consisting of foreign statutes or codes and decisions by the 
national courts of foreign countries. As a general rule, foreign law, unlike 
international law, is not binding on the United States, unless there is such 
a consensus among the legal systems of the world that a particular rule 
has gained the status of a general principle of law, in which case the rule 
may have a status akin to that of customary international law.15
The question remains, however, what does it mean to say that the 
United States is bound by a treaty provision or a rule of customary 
international law? The federal courts have created some rules with 
respect to the relationship between federal statutes and treaties, such as 
the Charming Betsy Rule16 and the Last-in-Time Rule.17 But these rules 
do not address whether federal courts are required to interpret the U.S. 
Constitution in a manner that is consistent with an international law rule. 
In the event it is not possible to reconcile the two, does international law 
ever trump the U.S. Constitution? Even if international law does not 
supersede the Constitution, is there an obligation to interpret the 
were bound to receive the law of nations, in its modern state of purity and refinement.”). 
 14. Despite this history and case law, some scholars have argued in recent years that 
customary international law is not part of the supreme law of the land such that it preempts state law. 
See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common 
Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997). This position has been 
soundly refuted by other scholars, such as Philip Jessup, Louis Henkin, Gerald Neuman, and Harold 
H. Koh who have used history, prior case law, and structural arguments based on federalism and 
separation of powers principles to demonstrate that customary international law is part of the binding 
law of the United States. See, e.g., Philip C. Jessup, The Doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins 
Applied to International Law, 33 AM. J. INT’L L. 740 (1939); Louis Henkin, The Constitution and 
United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 
876 (1987); Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About Customary International Law: A 
Response to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 371 (1997); Harold Hongju 
Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law Home, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 623, 666-67, 
n.221 (1998); Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824 
(1998) [hereinafter Koh, International Law]. Jessup’s argument was accepted by the Supreme Court 
in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425–28 (1964), and subsequent cases. See 
Koh, International Law, supra note 15, at 1834-38 and accompanying footnotes. 
 15. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (The court noted a survey that 
showed that torture had been banned in more than 55 national constitutions, thus supporting a 
determination that torture is prohibited by customary international law). 
 16. In Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804), the Supreme 
Court held that “an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any 
other possible construction” exists. 
 17. “By the Constitution, a treaty is placed on the same footing, and made of like obligation, 
with an act of legislation. Both are declared by that instrument to be the supreme law of the land, and 
no superior efficacy is given to either over the other. When the two relate to the same subject, the 
courts will always endeavor to construe them so as to give effect to both, if that can be done without 
violating the language of either; but if the two are inconsistent, the one last in date will control the 
other, provided always the stipulation of the treaty on the subject is self-executing.” Whitney v. 
Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888). 
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Constitution in a manner consistent with international law principles 
similar to the Charming Betsy doctrine for statutes? If yes, when? The 
following sections examine these questions and suggest some answers. 
 
III.  WHY AND HOW ARE INTERNATIONAL AND FOREIGN LAW 
CURRENTLY USED BY THE U.S. SUPREME COURT? 
 
The justices on the current U.S. Supreme Court largely fall into two 
camps with respect to whether and how the Court should use 
international or foreign law in its jurisprudence. A minority of the 
justices, usually led by Justice Scalia, has been outspoken against the use 
of foreign and, to a lesser extent, international law as a basis for 
constitutional interpretation. The majority, on the other hand, finds 
international and foreign law to be instructive and seems increasingly 
willing to refer to such sources in decision-making. 
 
A.  Justice Scalia’s “Anti-Foreign Law” Position 
 
Justice Scalia has expressed far stronger opposition to the use of 
foreign legal materials, which he defines as statutes and judicial 
opinions, than he has to international law. Despite his “anti-foreign law” 
position, he certainly does not reject the use of all international and 
foreign law.18 However, Justice Scalia has been one of the most vocal 
and colorful critics of the Supreme Court’s references to international 
and foreign law in recent cases, writing several dissenting opinions in 
which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas have joined. Because 
he has spoken publicly on the topic on more than one occasion, Justice 
Scalia’s remarks are used herein to illustrate the positions of those who 
generally oppose the use of foreign and international law by the U.S. 
Supreme Court.19 Where appropriate, additional criticisms made by other 
judges and scholars are included to more fully address all the arguments 
that have been raised in opposition to the use of international and foreign 
law in constitutional jurisprudence. 
Justice Scalia believes international and foreign law may be relevant 
in some cases. He agrees that treaties ratified by the U.S. are part of the 
supreme law of the land and he will use international law in the 
 18. Justice Antonin Scalia, Keynote Address to the American Society of International Law: 
Foreign Legal Authority in the Federal Courts (April 2, 2004), in 98 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 305 
(2004) [hereinafter Scalia Keynote Address]. 
 19. Id.; see also Justices Antonin Scalia and Stephen Breyer, Transcript of Discussion at the 
American University College of Law (January 13, 2005), at 5, http://domino.american. 
edu/AU/media/mediarel.nsf/1D265343BDC2189785256B810071F2 [hereinafter AU Transcript]. 
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interpretation of a treaty.20 In addition, Justice Scalia has stated that, 
“[f]oreign constructions [of international treaties] are evidence of the 
original shared understanding of the contracting parties” and are 
therefore appropriately taken into account.21 Justice Scalia also believes 
that it is appropriate for the Court to consult foreign or international law 
when directed by a federal statute to do so, such as the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act.22 Finally, Justice Scalia has stated that: 
 
[F]oreign statutory and judicial law can be consulted in assessing the 
argument that a particular construction of an ambiguous provision in a 
federal statute would be disastrous. If foreign courts have long been 
applying precisely the rule argued against, and disaster has not ensued, 
unless there is some countervailing factor at work the argument can 
safely be rejected.23
 
On the other hand, Justice Scalia has strenuously objected to the use 
of foreign law for two primary reasons. First, Justice Scalia does not 
believe foreign legal materials should be allowed to influence the 
determination of the substantive meaning of the words of the 
Constitution itself.24 Justice Scalia suggests that foreign law should not 
be authoritative because we as a nation do not “want to be governed by 
the views of foreigners.”25 Second, Justice Scalia has criticized the Court 
for its selective use of foreign law without clearly articulated standards 
as to when foreign law should be consulted.26
In addition to these two primary objections, Justice Scalia also is 
critical of the Court’s use of foreign law when it has not made a 
sufficient inquiry into whether the foreign legal system is sufficiently 
similar to that of the United States such that fair comparisons can be 
made.27 If the justices use foreign law, they have to select which rules to 
follow among competing rules and there are no criteria to follow in 
deciding which foreign law to use.28
 20. AU Transcript, supra note 20, at 5. 
 21. Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 660 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 22. Scalia Keynote Address, supra note 19, at 306. Although Justice Scalia would limit any 
claims based on the law of nations to the law of nations as understood in the 18th century. See Sosa v. 
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 748-51 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
 23. Scalia Keynote Address, supra note 19, at 306. 
 24. Id. at 307. Justice Scalia only discusses foreign legal materials here and not international 
legal materials. For a fuller explanation of Justice Scalia’s approach to constitutional interpretation 
and his objections to the use of foreign and international law in that endeavor, see infra Part V. 
 25. AU Transcript, supra note 20, at 5. 
 26. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 622-28 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 27. Id. at 624 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 28. AU Transcript, supra note 20, at 5. Like Justice Scalia, Seventh Circuit Judge Richard 
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B. Why Some Justices Are Willing to Use International or Foreign Law 
 
Justice Breyer has been one of the most outspoken justices in favor 
of using foreign and international law. He has pointed out that foreign 
judges and U.S. Supreme Court justices are both human beings facing 
similar problems.29 In addition, many foreign societies are becoming 
more democratic. Foreign judges interpret documents that protect basic 
human rights, similar to the U.S. Constitution’s Bill of Rights.30 For 
these reasons, U.S. Supreme Court justices can learn from the experience 
of foreign judges who have faced similar issues.31 Justices who favor 
consideration of international and foreign legal sources do not suggest, 
however, that the U.S. Supreme Court is in any way bound by the 
interpretations of these foreign judges; only that we may learn from 
them.32 Thus, this group of justices appears to advocate the use of foreign 
materials primarily for comparative purposes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Posner also is concerned about the use of foreign and international law. Judge Posner cites four 
problems with using foreign and international law: (1) there are too many sources, making research 
difficult; (2) foreign judges come from different “socio-historico-politico-institutional backgrounds” 
making accurate and fair comparisons difficult; (3) foreign judges have no democratic legitimacy in 
the U.S.; and (4) judges use foreign and international law to justify their own personal preferences. 
See Richard Posner, No Thanks, We Already Have Our Own Laws, LEGAL AFF., July-Aug. 2004, at 
40, available at http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/July-August-2004/feature_posner_julaug04.html. 
All of these concerns are addressed in infra Part V. 
 29. AU Transcript, supra note 20, at 5. 
 30. See AU Transcript, supra note 20, at 6–7. In her recent keynote address to the American 
Society of International Law, Justice Ginsberg noted, “an evolving appreciation that U.S. judges are 
not alone in the endeavor to interpret fundamental human rights norms and apply them to concrete 
cases” and opined that “[t]he U.S. judicial system will be the poorer, I believe, if we do not share our 
experience with, and learn from, legal systems with values and a commitment to democracy similar 
to our own.” Ruth Bader Ginsberg, “A Decent Respect to the Opinions of [Human]kind”: The Value 
of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, 99 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 351, 
351 (2005). 
 31. AU Transcript, supra note 20, at 7. Several of the Supreme Court justices have expressed 
agreement with this view. See Ruth Bader Ginsberg, Looking Beyond Our Borders: The Value of a 
Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, 40 IDAHO L. REV. 1 (2003); Justice Sandra 
Day O’Connor, Keynote Address Before the Ninety-Sixth Annual Meeting of the American Society 
of International Law (Mar. 16, 2002), in 96 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 348, 350 (2002). Even Chief 
Justice Rehnquist has expressed the view that “it’s time the U.S. courts began looking to the 
decisions of other constitutional courts to aid in their own deliberative process.” William H. 
Rehnquist, Foreward to DEFINING THE FIELD OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW viii (Vicki 
C. Jackson & Mark Tushnet, eds., Praeger Publishers 2002). 
 32. AU Transcript, supra note 20, at 6. 
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C.  Recent Examples of Cases in Which International and Foreign Law 
Has Been Used by the U.S. Supreme Court 
 
Given these different attitudes toward the use of international and 
foreign law in U.S. constitutional jurisprudence, it is appropriate to 
examine how these sources actually are being used by the current 
Supreme Court. As mentioned at the outset of this article, there have 
been a number of cases in the past few years in which the Supreme Court 
has referred to international or foreign law sources in its opinions.33
In Atkins v. Virginia, the Supreme Court struck down a Virginia law 
permitting the execution of mentally retarded persons.34 The Court held 
that imposing capital punishment on mentally retarded persons 
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the 
Eighth Amendment because such persons have “disabilities in areas of 
reasoning, judgment, and control of their impulses” and, therefore, “do 
not act with the level of moral culpability that characterizes the most 
serious adult criminal conduct.”35 In assessing the constitutionality of 
capital punishment for mentally retarded persons, the Court stated that it 
must be determined whether the punishment is excessive based on 
currently prevailing moral standards.36 The Court further held that the 
best evidence of those standards is state legislation and found that the 
trend is toward prohibiting capital punishment for mentally retarded 
persons.37 The Court then noted that this trend “reflects a much broader 
social and professional consensus,”38 citing several amicus briefs. Of 
relevance here, one of the amicus briefs cited by the Court was the Brief 
for the European Union filed as Amicus Curiae in another case, 
McCarver v. North Carolina, O.T.2001, No. 00-8727, which established 
that “within the world community, the imposition of the death penalty for 
crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly 
disapproved.”39
Justice Scalia wrote a scathing dissent in Atkins ridiculing the 
majority’s attempt to find a consensus where less than a majority of 
 33. See cases cited supra note 1. 
 34. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 35. Id. at 306. The court also held that these disabilities can jeopardize the fairness of the 
proceedings against such persons. Id. 
 36. Id. at 311. The Court’s current Eight Amendment jurisprudence is based on its holding in 
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958), wherein the Court held that, “[t]he Amendment must 
draw its meaning from evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” 
 37. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311–16. 
 38. Id. at 316 n.21. 
 39. Id. at 316 n.21. The Court also referred to an earlier case in which it had considered the 
views of “other nations that share our Anglo-American heritage, and by the leading members of the 
Western European community.” See id. 
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states had enacted legislation outlawing capital punishment for mentally 
retarded criminals.40 He directed his harshest criticism, however, at the 
majority’s reference to the views of the “world community,” stating: 
 
But the Prize for the Court’s Most Feeble Effort to fabricate “national 
consensus” must go to its appeal (deservedly relegated to a footnote) to 
the views of assorted professional and religious organizations, members 
of the so-called “world community,” and respondents to opinion 
polls . . . Equally irrelevant are the practices of the “world community,” 
whose notions of justice are (thankfully) not always those of our 
people.41
 
A second recent case which illustrates this debate regarding currently 
prevailing moral standards is Lawrence v. Texas,42 where the Court 
found unconstitutional a Texas statute that made it a crime for two 
persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct 
because the statute violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.43 Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, used 
international law to refute earlier claims by Chief Justice Burger in 
Bowers v. Hardwick44 that “[d]ecisions of individuals relating to 
homosexual conduct have been subject to state intervention throughout 
the history of Western civilization. Condemnation of those practices is 
firmly rooted in Judeao [sic]-Christian moral and ethical standards.”45 
Justice Kennedy pointed out that Chief Justice Burger’s “sweeping 
references . . . to the history of Western civilization and to Judeo-
Christian moral and ethical standards did not take account of other 
authorities pointing in an opposite direction.”46 Specifically, Justice 
Kennedy cited European practices in this regard, including case law of 
the European Court of Human Rights, in which the European Court held 
that laws similar to the Texas statute were invalid under the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.47
Again, Justice Scalia dissented, this time joined by Chief Justice 
 40. Id. at 337 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 41. Id. at 347–48. 
 42. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 43. Id. at 578. 
 44. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (Burger, CJ, concurring). 
 45. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571 (citing Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196). 
 46. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572. 
 47. Id. at 573. Forty-five European nations currently ascribe to the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. In addition, the Court cited an amicus 
brief filed by Mary Robinson, former United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, which 
established that other nations have also taken action consistent with an affirmation of the protected 
right of homosexual adults to engage in intimate, consensual conduct. Id. at 576. 
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Rehnquist and Justice Thomas.48 And once again, Justice Scalia took 
issue with the majority’s reliance on the “views of a wider civilization.”49 
Justice Scalia argued that Chief Justice Burger’s statements in Bowers 
were mere dicta and were not the basis for the court’s decision.50 
Therefore, there was no need for the majority in Lawrence to refute them 
by way of reference to other nations’ views on the issue.51
The most recent case involving foreign law is Roper v. Simmons.52 In 
Roper, the Supreme Court was called on to reconsider whether the 
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishments” 
forbids the execution of a juvenile offender who was older than fifteen 
but younger than eighteen when he committed a capital crime.53 Just 
fifteen years previously, in Stanford v. Kentucky,54 a divided Supreme 
Court upheld the ability of states to impose capital punishment on 
persons between the ages of fifteen and eighteen. At that time, the Court 
determined that no national consensus existed sufficient to label such 
punishment cruel and unusual.55 In Roper, the Supreme Court held that 
enough states have now abolished the death penalty for juvenile 
offenders to warrant a finding of a national consensus against the 
execution of juvenile offenders.56 As a result, a 5-4 majority of the Roper 
court held that Stanford is no longer controlling. 
Writing for the majority in Roper, Justice Kennedy stated that the 
decision “finds confirmation in the stark reality that the United States is 
the only country in the world that continues to give official sanction to 
the juvenile death penalty.”57 The opinion further states that while “this 
reality does not become controlling,” the Court “has referred to the laws 
of other countries and to international authorities as instructive for its 
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and 
unusual punishment’” for almost fifty years.58 The opinion then cites 
several international treaties that ban the juvenile death penalty, 
including the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the 
American Covenant on Human Rights, and the African Charter on the 
 48. Id. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 49. Id. at 598. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 53. Id. at 555. 
 54. 492 U.S. 361 (1989). 
 55. Id. at 362. 
 56. Roper, 543 U.S. at 567–68. 
 57. Id. at 575. 
 58. Id. 
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Rights and Welfare of the Child. Of seven other countries that have 
executed juveniles since the Stanford decision, the opinion states that all 
of them have since abolished or disavowed the practice.59 As a result, the 
Court concluded, “it is fair to say that the United States now stands alone 
in a world that has turned its face against the juvenile death penalty.”60
The Court placed special emphasis on the fact that the United 
Kingdom has long since abolished the juvenile death penalty. The Court 
indicated that the United Kingdom’s experience has particular relevance 
in light of the historic ties between our countries and in light of the 
Eighth Amendment’s own origins (it is modeled on a parallel provision 
in the English Declaration of Rights of 1689).61 Finally, the Court 
concluded that while the overwhelming opinion of the world community 
against the juvenile death penalty is not controlling, it does provide 
“respected and significant confirmation” for the Court’s conclusions.62
Justice O’Connor wrote a dissenting opinion in which she discussed 
the appropriate use of foreign and international law. She stated that 
because she believes there is lack of national consensus against the 
juvenile death penalty, she cannot assign a “confirmatory role to the 
international consensus described by the Court.”63 However, she stated 
that reference to foreign and international law is relevant to the Court’s 
assessment of evolving standards of decency because of the special 
character of the Eighth Amendment, which draws its meaning directly 
from the maturing values of a civilized society.64 In this case, however, 
the existence of a global consensus cannot alter the fact that domestic 
consensus is lacking. 
Justice Scalia also wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justice 
Thomas and Chief Justice Rehnquist joined, once again attacking the use 
of foreign and international law by the majority.65 Justice Scalia accused 
the majority of treating the views of U.S. citizens as “essentially 
irrelevant” while “the views of other countries and the so-called 
international community take center stage.”66 He pointed out that the 
President and the Senate, the political bodies charged with making and 
ratifying treaties, have specifically declined to join the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (CRC)67 and have entered a reservation to the ICCPR 
 59. Id. at 576. 
 60. Id. at 577. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 578. 
 63. Id. at 604 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 64. Id. at 604–05 
 65. Id. at 607 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 66. Id. at 622. 
 67. Id. at 622–23. The U.S. signed the CRC in 1995, but it has not yet been presented to the 
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preserving the right to execute juveniles.68 According to Justice Scalia, 
these facts suggest that our country has not reached a national consensus 
against the juvenile death penalty.69 He also chastised the majority for 
not inquiring more deeply into whether foreign legal systems are 
sufficiently similar to that of the United States such that fair comparisons 
can be made. Most fundamentally, however, Justice Scalia rejected 
outright the idea that American law should conform to the laws of the 
rest of the world.70 In fact, he pointed out that when the practices of 
foreign nations do not conform to the views of the majority of the Court, 
those foreign practices are rejected, citing examples such as the Court’s 
establishment clause and abortion jurisprudence.71
While the Roper opinion was pending, Justice Scalia had an 
opportunity to elaborate publicly on his view of the relationship between 
the Court’s jurisprudence and foreign and international law.72 Although 
clearly not Justice Scalia’s preferred approach, he recognized that in 
some areas of constitutional jurisprudence, beginning with the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, the Supreme 
Court has adopted the notion that the Constitution is not static.73 Rather, 
the meaning of the constitution “changes from era to era to comport 
with . . . ‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society.’”74 Justice Scalia does not believe this approach is 
correct because it allows judges to decide what is best based on their own 
personal viewpoints.75 However, if one accepts the notion that it is 
appropriate to look to evolving standards of decency, Justice Scalia 
argues that one should only look to the standards of decency in American 
society, not the standards of decency in foreign countries because foreign 
countries do not share our background, culture, and moral views.76 
Senate for its advice and consent. United Nations Convention of the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 
1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/11.htm (last 
visited October 8, 2006). 
 68. It is important to note that the United States joined the ICCPR in 1992, closer in time to 
the Stanford decision and at a time when the present national consensus did not yet exist. See S. REP. 
NO. 102-23 (1992), as reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 645, 659 (1992). 
 69. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 622 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 70. Id. at 624. 
 71. Id. at 625–26. 
 72. See AU Transcript, supra note 20. 
 73. AU Transcript, supra note 20, at 8. 
 74. AU Transcript, supra note 20, at 8 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)). 
 75. AU Transcript, supra note 20, at 9. Judge Robert H. Bork has raised a similar concern in 
his book, COERCING VIRTUE: THE WORLDWIDE RULE OF JUDGES (American Enterprise Institute 
Press 2003). 
 76. AU Transcript, supra note 20, at 9. Justice Scalia suggests that the opinion of a “wise 
Zimbabwe judge or a wise member of the House of Lords law committee” have little to do with what 
Americans believe. Id. at 11. While there are clearly reasons to be more cautious about the use of 
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Justice Scalia would find American standards of decency in state 
legislation because such legislation is democratically adopted by the 
American people.77
As will be shown below, attempts to completely “wall off” the U.S. 
Constitution from international and foreign law are (1) contrary to the 
development of international law as incorporated into U.S. law, including 
the concepts of sovereignty and international human rights; (2) not 
consistent with the Framer’s understanding of the relationship between 
individual rights, international law, and the Constitution; (3) not 
supported by the history of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence; and (4) 
not good policy. The majority position of the Supreme Court better 
reflects this history and understanding and should continue to be 
developed through the Court’s jurisprudence. 
 
IV.  INFLUENCE OF INTERNATIONAL AND FOREIGN LAW ON THE U.S. 
CONSTITUTION 
 
From before the founding of the United States of America, 
international law, previously referred to as the law of nations,78 exercised 
a heavy influence on the development of the U.S. Constitution and the 
Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence. Likewise, the Framers of 
the Constitution were familiar with international and foreign law and 
often drew on that knowledge in deciding how to form a new nation. 
Two areas of international law were particularly relevant to the 
creation and development of the United States as a constitutional 
government and its protection of individual rights. First, the international 
law concept of sovereignty helped the fledgling United States to gain 
international recognition and imposed obligations on the federal 
government vis-à-vis other nations, as well as towards its own subjects. 
As explained below, the concept of sovereignty has continued to evolve, 
which in turn has implications for a state such as the United States 
claiming to be sovereign. Second, the evolution of the meaning of 
foreign law in constitutional decision-making (see discussion infra Part V), Justice Scalia’s 
statement demonstrates an underlying assumption that Americans are somehow fundamentally 
different from persons in other countries, such that foreign laws and judicial decisions can never be 
relevant to Americans. This view is one of the underlying assumptions that separates Justice Scalia 
from other justices, like Justice Breyer, who views the world as full of human beings with common 
problems and struggles who can learn from one another’s experiences. AU Transcript, supra note 
20, at 10–11. 
 77. AU Transcript, supra note 20, at 17. Responses to Justice Scalia’s concerns regarding 
judges’ basing their decisions on personal preferences and a lack of democratic legitimacy are 
addressed infra Part V of this article. 
 78. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND 
LEGISLATION 260–61 (1823). 
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sovereignty paralleled the development of international human rights 
law. International human rights law was greatly influenced by individual 
rights jurisprudence that had developed under the U.S. Constitution. Both 
sovereignty and international human rights law have their roots in natural 
law concepts and the evolution of each has impacted the development of 
the other. Concepts of natural law, sovereignty and, later, human rights, 
all influenced the framing of the Constitution and its interpretation over 
the past two centuries. Accordingly, it is appropriate to take these 
sources into account both to understand the original goals and purposes 
of the Constitution and to understand how the Constitution should be 
interpreted and applied today.79 Thus, this next section will focus on the 
development of these two aspects of international law, their impact on 
U.S. constitutional law, and their relevance to this current constitutional 
debate. 
 
A.  Natural Law Foundations of International Law 
 
Both the international law of sovereignty and international human 
rights law developed from concepts of natural law.80 Natural law, in turn, 
is sometimes said to be synonymous with, and sometimes derived from, 
divine law.81 Both divine law and natural law are considered “higher 
law” that is universally applicable and superior to positive law created by 
governments.82 One of the primary differences between the two is that 
divine law is said to come from God, whereas some theorists suggest that 
natural law is a product of “right reason.”83 The next section elaborates 
on how natural law theories laid the foundation for the international law 
of sovereignty and international human rights law. 
 79. Professor Cass Sunstein might label this reasoning a form of “soft originalism,” which he 
defines as making a historical inquiry “not to obtain specific answers to specific questions, but 
instead to get a more general sense of goals and purposes.” CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING 
AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 173 (Oxford University Press 1996). 
 80. See Jay, supra note 12, at 821–22. “The ‘law of nations’ and ‘the law of nature’ were 
closely allied concepts for [Chief Justice] Marshall and his contemporaries.” G. Edward White, The 
United Sates Constitution in its Third Century: Foreign Affairs: History: The Marshall Court and 
International Law: The Piracy Cases, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 727, 728 (1989). 
 81. See Jay, supra note 12, at 822–23. Some scholars have suggested that the existence of 
divine law is evidenced by the universality of certain religious beliefs. For example, all the major 
religions of the world adopt a version of what the Christians call the “Golden Rule,” i.e., “do unto 
others as you would have them do unto you.” PAUL GORDON LAUREN, THE EVOLUTION OF 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: VISIONS SEEN 5 (University of Pennsylvania Press 2d ed. 2003). 
 82. See CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU, THE HIGHER LAWS: ORIGINS OF MODERN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW v (William S. Hein & Co. 1994). Antieau provides examples of the 
universality of divine and natural law from Ancient Greek, Roman and Chinese philosophers, as well 
as from Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. Id. at 2, 6, 20–21, 28. 
 83. See id. at 49; MAURICE CRANSTON, WHAT ARE HUMAN RIGHTS? 10–11 (Taplinger Pub. 
Co. 1973). 
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B.  International Law of Sovereignty 
 
The concept of sovereign states grew out of natural law concepts of 
equality of persons,84 but transformed the equality of persons into an 
equality of states. Over time, the concept of sovereignty has changed and 
grown to have a number of different meanings and aspects.85 This 
evolution, in turn, affects what it means for a state like the United States 
that claims to be sovereign. Thus, the next section examines the evolving 
concept of sovereignty in an effort to understand how the concept of 
sovereignty affected the founding of the United States and the drafting of 
its new constitution and how its continuing evolution over the last two 
centuries has impacted the United States. 
 
1.  Evolving definition of sovereignty 
 
Traditional definitions of sovereignty often emphasized the powers 
or rights of the sovereign, and not its responsibilities. The French 
philosopher, Jean Bodin is often credited with first stating the theory of 
sovereignty in his 1576 Les Six Livres de la République.86 Bodin asserted 
that sovereignty is defined as power absolute and perpetual, “supreme,” 
and “subject to no law.”87 Only a state possessed the power to decide 
how it would treat its people within its own borders and those under its 
control elsewhere.88 Thomas Hobbes concurred in The Leviathan.89
While Bodin argued that the sovereign was not subject to positive 
 84. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT 309 (Cambridge University Press 
1960). Equality of persons is said to be part of divine law, as it is a basic tenet of many major faiths, 
including Judaism, Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam. LAUREN, supra note 82, at 6–8, 11. 
 85. For a description of the historical roots of the concept of sovereignty, see JEREMY A. 
RABKIN, LAW WITHOUT NATIONS? WHY CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT REQUIRES SOVEREIGN 
STATES? 47–62 (Princeton University Press 2005). 
 86. See F. H. HINSLEY, SOVEREIGNTY 71 (Cambridge University Press 2d ed. 1986); Ivan 
Simonovic, State Sovereignty and Globalization: Are Some States More Equal?, 28 GA. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 381, 382 (2000). 
 87. JEAN BODIN, ON SOVEREIGNTY: FOUR CHAPTERS FROM THE SIX BOOKS OF THE 
COMMONWEALTH 1, 11 (Julian H. Franklin, ed. and trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1992) (1576). 
 88. Id. Stephen Krasner refers to a state’s ability to exclude external actors from a given 
territory as Westphalian sovereignty and a state’s ability to exercise effective control within its 
borders as domestic sovereignty. STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 3–
4 (Princeton University Press 1999). 
 89. THOMAS HOBBES, THE LEVIATHAN 120–128 (Penguin Books 1985) (1651). 
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law because the sovereign creates the positive laws, the sovereign was 
still bound by the laws of nature.90 Likewise, St. Thomas Aquinas and his 
followers believed that the Pope could be disciplined if he violated 
divine or natural law.91 Hugo Grotius also attempted to reconcile the 
concept of an independent and all-powerful sovereign with the concept 
of natural law, to which the sovereign was still subject.92 He theorized 
that the original sovereignty of the people was transferred to a sovereign 
government, which had the function and duty to protect the people in 
exchange.93 This theme was carried forward in John Locke’s SECOND 
TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, in which he emphasizes the social contract 
between the people and the sovereign government.94 These concepts of 
sovereignty formed the basis of the modern nation-state, with Locke’s 
social contract theory having special relevance for the United States. 
Many of the founding fathers were heavily influenced by the theories 
of John Locke. In his SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT, Locke 
asserted that everyone is born into a state of nature in which everyone is 
equal and is perfectly free to do as they choose within the bounds of the 
laws of nature.95 Life in this state of nature is uncertain and constantly 
exposed to invasion by others.96 Men act as judges in their own cases and 
have a tendency to be partial to their own cases and those of their 
friends.97 As a result, individuals choose to give up some of their 
freedom to form a political society or civil government, the purpose of 
which is to remedy the inconveniences of the state of nature and protect 
the lives, liberties, and property of the persons in the society.98 In this 
political society, every man obligates himself to every other man to 
submit to the determination of the majority and to be bound by it.99 
Locke calls this state of affairs a social compact.100
The American Revolution took Locke’s theories and put them into 
practice. The idea of popular sovereignty became the basis of political 
 90. Simonovic, supra note 87, at 383; see also RABKIN, supra note 86, at 55. To the contrary, 
Hobbes’ sovereign was not subject to any law, including natural law. HINSLEY, supra note 87, at 
142–43. Hobbes’ ideas ultimately were rejected in favor of those of John Locke. HINSLEY, supra 
note 87, at 146–49. 
 91. HINSLEY, supra note 87, at 95. 
 92. Id. at 139. 
 93. See id. 
 94. LOCKE, supra note 85. 
 95. Id. at 309. 
 96. Id. at 395. 
 97. Id. at 316. 
 98. Id. at 316, 367, 395. 
 99. Id. at 376. 
 100. Id. 
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legitimacy for the new Republic.101 Several of the founding documents 
contain the word sovereignty, including the Declaration and Resolves of 
the First Continental Congress, the Declaration of Independence and the 
Articles of Confederation.102 The people of the thirteen colonies 
consented to the exercise of power over them by a federal government in 
exchange for the protection of that government.103 Thus, partly as a result 
of Locke’s ideas and certain political movements such as the American 
and French Revolutions, the concept of sovereignty changed from an 
emphasis on the sovereignty of the state to an emphasis on the 
sovereignty of the people. 
 
2.  Modern concepts of sovereignty 
 
The meaning of sovereignty has not remained static since the 
founding of the nation. More recent political pronouncements and 
scholarly treatments of the subject of sovereignty have rightly given 
greater emphasis to the idea that sovereignty has both internal and 
external aspects.104 In 2000, the government of Canada spearheaded the 
formation of the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS). The ICISS concluded that, “sovereignty implies a 
dual responsibility: externally—to respect the sovereignty of other states, 
and internally, to respect the dignity and basic rights of all the people 
within the state.”105 This theme has been echoed by United Nations 
Secretary General Kofi Annan106 and the U.N. High-Level Panel on 
Threats, Challenges and Change. In its recent report, the U.N. High-
Level Panel stated: 
 
In signing the Charter of the United Nations, States not only benefit 
 101. See W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International 
Law, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 866, 867 (1990). 
 102. See Declaration and Resolves of the First Continental Congress (Oct. 14, 1774), reprinted 
in THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 154–155 (Bruce Frohnen ed, Liberty Fund 2002) [hereinafter 
Declaration and Resolves]; THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776) reprinted in THE 
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 189 (Bruce Frohnen ed, Liberty Fund 2002) [hereinafter DECLARATION OF 
INDEPENDENCE]. See also RABKIN, supra note 86, at 45 (In fact, “[i]n the text of The Federalist 
Papers, . . . the terms ‘sovereign’ or ‘sovereignty’ appear more often than ‘freedom’ . . . 
‘republic’ . . . or ‘morals.’”). 
 103. See Reisman, supra note 102, at 867. 
 104. Simonovic, supra note 87, at 384. See also Ronald A. Brand, External Sovereignty and 
International Law, 18 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1685, 1689 (1995). 
 105. Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The 
Responsibility to Protect 8 (International Development Research Centre 2001). 
 106. Press Release, Kofi Annan, Secretary-General, Secretary-General Addresses International 
Peace Academy Seminar on ‘The Responsibility to Protect,’ U.N Doc. SG/SM/8125 (Feb. 15, 2002), 
available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/sgsm8125.doc.htm. 
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from the privileges of sovereignty but also accept its responsibilities. 
Whatever perceptions may have prevailed when the Westphalian 
system first gave rise to the notion of State sovereignty, today it clearly 
carries with it the obligation of a State to protect the welfare of its own 
peoples and meet its obligations to the wider international 
community.107  
 
Thus, sovereignty has an external component which concerns relations 
with other states and an internal component which concerns relations 
between the government and the governed. 
a.  External aspects of sovereignty. The external component of 
sovereignty relates to the international law of sovereignty, which defines 
the criteria for statehood recognition as an equal member of the 
international community and regulates how nations are to behave toward 
one another.108 Emphasizing the international law aspects of sovereignty, 
the International Court of Justice has defined sovereignty as: “the whole 
body of rights and attributes which a state possesses in its territory, to the 
exclusion of all other states, and also in its relations with other states.”109 
Thus, under international law, the concept of sovereignty bestows an 
equality of states and independence of action.110 It is reflected in 
international law in a variety of ways, such as in the United Nations 
Charter.111 Thus, the concept of sovereignty derives from international 
law and sovereign states must take international law into account when 
exercising their sovereign powers.112
These external or international aspects of sovereignty were crucial to 
the formation of the new United States of America.113 They guaranteed 
 107. High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared 
Responsibility, ¶ 21, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004). 
 108. Stephen Krasner refers to “the practices associated with mutual recognition” of states as 
“international legal sovereignty.” KRASNER, supra note 89, at 3. 
 109. Corfu Channel Case, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 43 (Apr. 9) (Individual Opinion by Judge Alvarez), 
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/icases/icc/icc_ijudgment/iCC_ijudgment_19490409_ 
alvarez_translation.pdf idecisions/isummaries/Iccsummary490409.htm. 
 110. Simonovic, supra note 87, at 384. Brierly states that natural rights of states generally 
include the rights of self-preservation, independence, equality, respect, and intercourse. J.L. 
BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PEACE 49 
(Sir Humphrey Waldock ed, Oxford University Press, 6th ed. 1963). 
 111. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 1. (“The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign 
equality of all its Members.”). 
 112. See Natsu Taylor Saito, Returning to First Principles: International Human Rights as 
U.S. Constitutionalism, 1 FIU L. REV. 45, 50 (2006). 
 113. Harold Hongju Koh, The United States Constitution and International Law: International 
Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 43, 44 (2004) [hereinafter Koh, Constitution and 
International Law] (“The framers and early Justices understood that the global legitimacy of a 
fledgling nation crucially depended upon the compatibility of its domestic law with the rules of the 
international system within which it sought acceptance.”(footnote omitted)). 
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her independence and equality among the community of states.114 They 
ensured her ability to enter into contracts, i.e., treaties and other 
international agreements, with other states and to enforce those 
contractual obligations.115
While international law is still concerned with the protection of these 
aspects of sovereignty, it now recognizes that sovereignty ultimately 
rests in the people. It is the object of modern international law to protect 
those people, not the authority wielding power.116 As a result, under 
international law today, sovereignty can be violated by an outside force 
or by an internal force that acts contrary to the wishes of the people.117 
Thus, the concept of sovereignty today places more emphasis on its 
internal aspects. 
b.  Internal aspects of sovereignty. This internal component of 
sovereignty requires that the sovereign state abide by its social contract 
with the people. In the United States, this social contract is embodied by 
the U.S. Constitution. Pursuant to this social contract, the people gave up 
certain freedoms and submitted themselves to the authority of the federal 
government, in exchange for certain protections from the government. 
Since pre-revolutionary times, it has been accepted that the primary 
purpose of the government is to act for the good of the people.118 Thus, 
the government has the right to make and enforce certain laws for the 
public welfare, but also has the duty to protect the people within its 
territory. 
 
3.  Influence of sovereignty theory on the United States 
 
The founders of the United States clearly believed in both the 
external and internal components of sovereignty theory and their natural 
law underpinnings. The Declaration and Resolves of the First 
Continental Congress provided: 
 
That the inhabitants of the English Colonies in North America, by the 
immutable laws of nature, the principles of the English constitution, 
and the several charters or compacts, have the following Rights: 
Resolved, N.C.D. 
 114. Jay, supra note 12, at 839–40. See also RABKIN, supra note 86, at 93–94, 112–13. 
 115. Jay, supra note 12, at 828; Saito, supra note 113, at 51. 
 116. Reisman, supra note 102, at 872. 
 117. See id. 
 118. Edwin S. Corwin, The “Higher Law” Background of American Constitutional Law, 42 
HARV. L. REV. 149, 392 (1928) (Locke insisted that the public good be the object of legislation and 
of government action in general). See also MARY BALDWIN, THE NEW ENGLAND CLERGY AND THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 22–23 (Duke University Press 1928). 
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1.  That they are entitled to life, liberty, and property, & they have 
never ceded to any sovereign power whatever, a right to dispose of 
either without their consent. 
2.  That our ancestors, who first settled these colonies were at the time 
of their emigration from the mother country, entitled to all the rights, 
liberties, and immunities of free and natural-born subjects within the 
realm of England.119
 
This theme of consent to be governed by way of a social contract 
based on natural law principles was carried forward in the Declaration of 
Independence: 
 
When in the Course of human events, it becomes necessary for one 
people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with 
another, and to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and 
equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God entitle 
them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they 
should declare the causes which impel them to the separation. 
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, 
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, 
that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to 
secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving 
their just powers from the consent of the governed.120
 
Finally, the preamble to the U.S. Constitution itself makes it clear 
that the “People” are coming together to form a compact for the purpose 
of creating a better life for themselves: 
 
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect 
Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the 
common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the 
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and 
establish this Constitution for the United States of America.121
 
Thus, the constitutional government of the United States is founded 
upon natural law theories of equality of persons and states, social 
 119. Declaration and Resolves, supra note 103 (emphasis added). 
 120. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 103 (emphasis added). Many religious 
leaders were chosen to assist in the work of making the new Constitution and many of their 
resolutions and instructions stressed natural law doctrines. BALDWIN, supra note 119, at 135–36, 
144. 
 121. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
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contract theory, and the idea that the primary purpose of the government 
is the protection and betterment of the people, all of which are part of the 
modern concept of sovereignty. 
In recognition of this history, sovereignty has been used by the 
Supreme Court as a source of federal power, rights, and duties. For 
example, in the Chinese Exclusion Cases, the Supreme Court found that 
sovereignty implied an authority to deal with matters relating to 
immigration, even though the power to regulate immigration was not 
expressly given to the federal government in the Constitution.122 
Likewise, there is no express constitutional grant of legislative power to 
Congress to make laws with respect to maritime matters, yet the federal 
courts have inferred such a grant in part by virtue of the “ancient 
jurisdiction” inherent in admiralty of sovereign states123 and the grant of 
judicial power in Article III § 2 to federal courts to hear cases of 
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.124 There also is no general foreign 
affairs power in the Constitution, but in Curtiss-Wright, Justice 
Sutherland stated that the foreign affairs power of the federal government 
came not from the states when they signed and ratified the U.S. 
Constitution, but from international law concepts of sovereignty.125 Thus, 
the Supreme Court has subscribed to these sovereignty theories and used 
them to justify action by the federal government. In so doing, the Court 
must also accept the duties that come with being a sovereign state—the 
most important of which is to conduct the government for the benefit of 
the people. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 122. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889) (“The power of exclusion 
of foreigners being an incident of sovereignty . . . .”); Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 658 
(1892) (“It is an accepted maxim of international law, that every sovereign nation has the power, as 
inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within 
its dominions, or to admit them only in such cases and under such conditions as it may see fit to 
prescribe.”). See also LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 18–26 (Foundation 
Press, 1972) [hereinafter HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS] 
 123. De Lovio v. Boit, 2 Gall. 398 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815); The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. 558, 572 
(1874); see also FRANK L. MARAIST & THOMAS C. GALLIGAN, ADMIRALTY IN A NUTSHELL 5 
(Thomson West 2005). 
 124. See S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917); Chelentis v. Luckenbach Steamship Co., 
247 U.S. 372 (1918); Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959). 
 125. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936). 
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C.  The Evolution of Individual Rights in the U.S. into International 
Human Rights 
 
Natural law theories exercised a heavy influence on the Founding 
Fathers not only with respect to ideas of sovereignty and social 
compacts, but also with respect to ideas of individual rights.126 The next 
section reviews the influence of natural law on the individual rights in 
the U.S. Constitution and the corresponding influence of those rights on 
modern-day conceptions of international human rights. 
 
1.  Natural law underpinnings of individual rights in the U.S. 
Constitution 
 
Most scholars agree that the Framers of the Constitution and Bill of 
Rights were committed to the idea of natural rights in the context of 
social contract political theory.127 In particular, the reasoning of John 
Locke and the example of the English Bill of Rights had a great 
influence on the U.S. Bill of Rights.128
In pre-revolutionary America, religious and political leaders (who 
were often one and the same) affirmed that positive laws must be in 
accord with divine law and natural law.129 For example, in 1717, John 
 126. While natural law theory was largely overtaken by positivist legal theory over the next 
century and a half, it has never been completely abandoned by the Supreme Court with respect to 
individual rights theory. It also regained credence in international law theory around the time of 
World War II in response to the actions of many totalitarian governments, which were largely 
authorized by positive law but which were clearly contrary to a broader understanding of human 
rights. See Alfred von Verdross, Forbidden Treaties in International Law, 31 AM. J. INT’L L. 571 
(1937). See also, Roger P. Alford, In Search of a Theory for Constitutional Comparitivism, 52 
UCLA L. REV. 639, 663–64 (2005). 
 127. Thomas B. McAffee, The Bill of Rights, Social Contract Theory, and the Rights 
“Retained” by the People, 16 S. ILL. U. L.J. 267, 271 (1992) (“The ratification debates over the 
Constitution are filled with the rhetoric of natural and inalienable rights, and both sides in the debate 
stood as pretenders to the role of guardian of such rights.”). See also Andrzej Rapaczynski, The 
Ninth Amendment and the Unwritten Constitution: The Problems of Constitutional Interpretation, 64 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 177, 179 (1988) (“It seems indubitable that the founding fathers believed in 
some form of ‘natural law’ and in some basic, unchanging standards of morality and political 
justice.”); Gordon A. Christenson, Using Human Rights Law to Inform Due Process and Equal 
Protection Analyses, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 3, 7 (1983). But see JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND 
DISTRUST 39, 50 (Harvard University Press 1980) (Ely argues that although the Constitution was 
“informed by natural law, this theme was far from universally accepted and probably was not even 
the majority view among those ‘framers’ we would be likely to think of first.” However, Ely 
acknowledges the importance of natural law, stating that while natural law is too vague to create 
rules, it would be “folly . . . to ignore it as a source of constitutional values.”). 
 128. LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS, 1, 6 (Columbia University Press 1990) [hereinafter 
HENKIN, AGE OF RIGHTS]; CRANSTON, supra note 84, at 1; Corwin, supra note 119, at 383 (“The 
conveyance of natural law ideas into American constitutional theory was the work preeminently—
though by no means exclusively—of John Locke’s Second Treatise on Civil Government.”). 
 129. ANTIEAU, supra note 83, at 12. In fact, many clergy of this period saw natural law and 
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Wise, a distinguished Massachusetts clergyman, preached that it is 
because “God does not permit it, that rulers cannot invade the rights and 
liberties of the people.”130 In 1744, Reverend Elisha Williams observed 
that arbitrary governments are not really governments, but tyrants, and 
are absolutely against the laws of God and nature.131 Richard Bland, a 
cousin of Thomas Jefferson from Virginia, wrote in 1766 that 
government is only lawful as long as “it will conduce to [men’s] 
happiness, which they have a natural right to promote.”132 According to 
all these men, when government violates higher law, the government is 
not worthy of respect.133 Governments were obliged to obey God’s law 
and to serve God’s people.134
Several of the Founding Fathers were ardent adherents of natural 
rights theory. They included James Wilson, James Madison,135 and John 
Adams.136 Likewise, Thomas Paine and Thomas Jefferson believed that 
there were natural rights which could not be restrained or repealed by 
human laws.137
The 1774 Declaration and Resolves of the First Continental Congress 
included natural law concepts regarding entitlement to life, liberty, and 
property.138 The Declaration was followed by the 1776 Virginia Bill of 
Rights, which foreshadowed the Declaration of Independence, and 
asserted several natural rights, including the right of equality, the right to 
enjoy life and liberty with the means of acquiring and possessing 
property, the right to pursue and obtain happiness and safety, the right to 
alter or abolish a government that does not act for the public good, the 
right to suffrage, the right of due process, the right not to be punished in 
any cruel or unusual manner, the right to freedom of the press, and the 
right of freedom of religion.139 Other states’ bills of rights also contained 
divine law as synonymous. BALDWIN, supra note 119, at 14–15, 22. 
 130. ANTIEAU, supra note 83, at 12. 
 131. See id. 
 132. Id. at 135. According to Mary Baldwin, “the social compact theory seems to have been 
accepted without question by the ministers of both the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.” 
BALDWIN, supra note 119, at 25.
 133. ANTIEAU, supra note 83, at 12. See also BALDWIN, supra note 119, at 19.
 134. BALDWIN, supra note 119, at 16, 23.
 135. THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH 
AMENDMENT 12–25, 36–37 (Randy E. Barnett ed, George Mason University Press 1989). 
 136. Corwin, supra note 119, at 401 (citing 3 Adams, Life and Works 374 (C.F. Adams, ed. 
1850) (John Adams recorded in his diary that he “was strenuous for retaining and insisting on [the 
law of nature].”). See also JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
197–98 (Carolina Academic Press 2d ed. 2003). 
 137. EDGAR BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE: THE PHILOSOPHY AND METHOD OF THE LAW 52 
(Harvard University Press 1974) [hereinafter BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE]. 
 138. Declaration and Resolves, supra note 103. 
 139. VA. CONST. Bill of Rights, June 12, 1776, reprinted in THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 57–
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similar natural rights guarantees. 
The Declaration of Independence followed shortly thereafter and was 
heavily influenced by Locke’s natural law theories as well.140 The 
Declaration suggests a right of self-determination based on natural law141 
and lists several inalienable rights, including equality of man, and the 
right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.142
In proposing the Bill of Rights to the Constitution, James Madison 
suggested certain amendments that he believed should properly be 
recommended by the Congress to the States, including the following: 
 
First. That there be prefixed to the Constitution a declaration, that all 
power is originally vested in, and consequently derived from, the 
people. 
That Government is instituted and ought to be exercised for the benefit 
of the people; which consists in the enjoyment of life and liberty, with 
the right of acquiring and using property, and generally of pursuing and 
obtaining happiness and safety. 
That the people have an indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasible right 
to reform or change their Government, whenever it be found adverse or 
inadequate to the purposes of its institution.143
 
In addition to these expressly enumerated rights, Madison’s proposed 
amendments also included references to unenumerated rights retained by 
the people: 
 
The exceptions here or elsewhere in the Constitution, made in favor of 
particular rights, shall not be so construed as to diminish the just 
importance of other rights retained by the people, or as to enlarge the 
powers delegated by the Constitution; but either as actual limitations of 
158 (Bruce Frohnen ed. 2002). 
 140. BRIERLY, supra note 111, at 50. 
 141. “When in the Course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve 
the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the powers of the 
earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God entitle them, a 
decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel 
them to the separation.” DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 103. 
 142. “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are 
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the 
pursuit of Happiness.” Id. Of course, the Declaration’s reference to all men was meant literally to 
include only men and not women, but was not to be read literally to include all men. The legal 
recognition of the fact that all persons shared these natural rights came later with the adoption of the 
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments. 
 143. James Madison, Speech Introducing Proposed Constitutional Amendments (June 8, 
1789), reprinted in THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 338 (Bruce Frohnen ed. 2002). 
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such powers, or as inserted merely for greater caution.144
 
This language came to be the present-day Ninth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution. 
The first government of United States also demonstrated its 
commitment to natural rights in connection with an incident that 
occurred during the French war with Great Britain in 1793. Three months 
after the declaration of war by France in February 1793, President 
George Washington issued a proclamation of neutrality on the part of the 
United States. Several difficult questions arose as to the United States’ 
rights and duties as a neutral country. Accordingly, Secretary of State 
Thomas Jefferson, at President George Washington’s request, wrote to 
the U.S. Supreme Court to solicit the justices’ advice regarding the 
international law of neutrality.145 In his letter, Jefferson asked the 
Supreme Court’s opinion as to both international law and the law of 
nature: 
 
The war which has taken place among the powers of Europe produces 
frequent transactions within our ports and limits, on which questions 
arise of considerable difficulty, and of greater importance to the peace 
of the United States. These questions depend for their solution on the 
construction of our treaties, on the laws of nature and nations, and on 
the law of the land, and are often presented under circumstances which 
do not give a cognizance of them to the tribunals of the country.146
 
The Supreme Court declined to provide the requested guidance for 
jurisprudential reasons.147 However, the correspondence is relevant in 
demonstrating the importance of natural law and international law to the 
early republic. 
As at least one scholar has suggested, “the modern debate is not over 
whether it was a central end of the Constitution to secure natural rights, 
but the relationship of such natural rights to the law of the 
Constitution.”148 This relationship is the subject of some of the following 
sections of this article. 
While the Constitution is the United States’ supreme positive law 
 144. Id. at 339 (emphasis added). 
 145. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the U.S. Supreme Court (July 1793), reprinted in 
CALVIN MASSEY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: POWERS AND LIBERTIES 70 (Aspen Publishers 
2005) (emphasis added). 
 146. Id. 
 147. See id. 
 148. McAffee, supra note 128, at 271. 
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that protects individual rights, its references to broadly worded rights, 
such as due process, and unenumerated rights require further 
explication.149 It makes some sense to use natural law theories regarding 
social compacts between the people and the government and the idea of 
inherent individual rights150 to perform this task given the influence of 
natural law on the Constitution’s drafting.151 However, the problem with 
natural law was and is, of course, that it is so hard to ascertain exactly 
what the “rules” of natural law are. As Professor Ely points out, natural 
law has historically been invoked to “support of all manner of causes in 
this country—some worthy, others nefarious.”152 Thus, while natural law 
may continue to inform our constitutional understandings, it has fallen 
out of favor as a method of creating rules for decision. This next section 
outlines the Supreme Court’s struggle to define the scope of both 
expressly enumerated rights and unenumerated rights through its history. 
As discussed below, international human rights principles can be used as 
the successor to natural law theory and provide more concrete rules of 
decision that can better inform our constitutional jurisprudence.153
 
2.  Unenumerated rights under the U.S. Constitution 
 
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has struggled over the years to 
locate the source and define the scope of rights not expressly mentioned 
in the Constitution, it has frequently declared that such rights exist and 
has taken on the role of guarantor of such rights. In finding and defining 
the existence and scope of such rights, some justices have relied on 
natural law concepts, others on the Ninth Amendment and others on the 
Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, or some 
combination thereof. 
a.  The influence of natural law theories on the U.S. Supreme Court 
as the basis of unenumerated rights. While not overwhelming in number, 
there have been several justices in the history of the U.S. Supreme Court 
who have demonstrated their awareness of the role of natural law in the 
framing of the Constitution and the corresponding appropriateness of 
using such theories in constitutional interpretation. What follows is a 
brief survey of some of the more important opinions in this regard. 
 149. HENKIN, AGE OF RIGHTS, supra note 129, at 84. 
 150. Id. at 84–85. 
 151. See ANTIEAU, supra note 83, at 12, 107, 109, 131, 135. 
 152. ELY, supra note 128, at 50. 
 153. See Ruti Teitel, Human Rights Genealogy, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 301, 308 (1997) 
(“[P]ostwar international human rights are commonly represented as an instance of natural law 
norms made positive.”). 
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James Wilson, an early justice of the Supreme Court, believed 
strongly in the existence of natural law.154 “[I]n his view human law was 
grounded on the consent of those whose obedience the law required. He 
thus linked the doctrine of natural law with the theory of popular 
sovereignty.”155 Like Locke, Wilson believed that the state was founded 
on the compact of its members, who united for the common benefit. 
According to Wilson, each man had a natural right to his property, his 
character, his liberty, and his safety.156 At least one scholar has described 
James Wilson’s philosophy as “the most consistent expression of 
classical American philosophy of law and government” and has stated 
that it was shared by most of the fathers of the Constitution.157
Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story also was a firm believer in the 
existence of natural law.158 In deciding United States v. La Jeune 
Eugenie, Justice Story took the position that a strong international trend 
against the slave trade, evidenced by numerous international declarations 
as well as by some municipal statutes directed against its legality, might 
justify judicial recognition of a rule of international law condemning 
such trade even though the institution of slavery had not been outlawed 
as unjust by some of the leading nations of the world.159
In Chisholm v. Georgia,160 a case involving the question of whether 
an action in assumpsit may lie against a state, several of the justices 
referred to natural law principles in their respective opinions. Similarly, 
in Calder v. Bull,161 a case involving the probate of a will, Justice Chase 
based his opinion on social compact theory and argued that any act of a 
legislature that is contrary to the principles of the social compact cannot 
be considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority.162 Finally, in 
Citizens’ Savings and Loan Association v. Topeka,163 the Supreme Court 
stated: 
 
 
 154. BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 138, at 51 (citing THE WORKS OF JAMES 
WILSON I 49 (James DeWitt Andrews ed., Callaghan & Co., 1896)). 
 155. BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 138, at 51(footnote omitted). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 52. 
 158. Joseph Story, Essay on Natural Law, reprinted in 34 OR. L. REV. 88 (1955). 
 159. United States v. Schooner La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 847 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) 
(No. 15,511). 
 160. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (2 Dall. 419) (1793). 
 161. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798). 
 162. Justice Iredell disputed this idea, arguing that the courts do not have the power to declare 
a law void as violative of natural justice. Id. at 399 For further discussion of the Supreme Court’s use 
of natural law theory, see Alford, supra note 127, at 659–68. 
 163. 87 U.S. 655 (1874). 
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[T]here are . . . rights in every free government beyond the control of 
the State. A government which recognized no such rights, which held 
the lives, the liberty, and the property of its citizens subject at all times 
to the absolute disposition and unlimited control of even the most 
democratic depository of power, is after all but a despotism. . . . There 
are limitations on such power which grow out of the essential nature of 
all free governments. Implied reservations of individual rights, without 
which the social compact could not exist, and which are respected by 
all governments entitled to the name.164
 
Using these cases and others, some scholars have demonstrated that 
natural law philosophy exercised a fairly significant influence on the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Bill of Rights, and especially the 
due process clause, during the Court’s early history.165
b.  The role of the Ninth Amendment. The influence of the idea of 
natural rights on the U.S. Constitution is particularly evident in the 
language of the Ninth Amendment which states: “The enumeration in the 
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage 
others retained by the people.”166 This language recognizes that the 
people possessed rights that existed prior to the U.S. Constitution; they 
were not created by the Constitution. 167 The partial listing in the 
Constitution of some of those antecedent rights should not be read in 
such a way as to undermine the existence or scope of any other non-
enumerated rights that were “retained by the people.”168
For example, in the case of Griswold v. Connecticut169 involving the 
right of access to contraceptives, Justice Douglas cited the Ninth 
Amendment in support of his opinion and stated that the Court was 
“deal[ing] with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights,”170 
leaving no doubt as to his belief in preexisting unenumerated 
constitutional rights (although he attempted to tie those unenumerated 
rights to enumerated rights through “penumbras” and “emanations”). 
Likewise, in his concurring opinion, Justice Goldberg stated his view 
 164. Id. at 663. 
 165. BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 138, at 50 (citing J.A.C. Grant, The Natural 
Law Background of Due Process, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 56 (1931)); Lowell J. Howe, The Meaning of 
Due Process of Law: Prior to the Adopting of the Fourteenth Amendment, 18 CAL. L. REV. 583, 588-
89 (1930). 
 166. U.S. CONST. amend. IX. 
 167. HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS, supra note 129, at 86, reprinted in BARNETT, supra note 
116, at 107. 
 168. HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS, supra note 129, at 86-87 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. 
IX). 
 169. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 170. Id. at 486. 
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that, “the language and history of the Ninth Amendment reveal that the 
Framers of the Constitution believed that there are additional 
fundamental rights, protected from governmental infringement, which 
exist alongside those fundamental rights specifically mentioned in the 
first eight constitutional amendments.”171
Some scholars have disputed the idea that U.S. citizens have any 
rights that may be protected by the government apart from those 
expressly enumerated in the Constitution.172 The fear seems to be that 
once we admit that unenumerated rights exist, judges will be free to 
exercise unlimited discretion in identifying and enforcing such rights.173 
To address this concern, only the democratically elected and more 
politically accountable Congress should be the arbiter of such rights. 
Thus, if Congress has not recognized the right, it does not exist as an 
enforceable right.174
In contrast, denying the existence and protection of preexisting 
unenumerated rights is contrary to the language of the documents on 
which this country was founded. For example, the Declaration of 
Independence refers to “inalienable rights,” which means that these 
rights are “incapable of being alienated, surrendered or transferred.”175 
Thus, it is not possible for the people to give any of their inalienable 
rights to the government. The Ninth Amendment assumes the existence 
of certain unnamed rights. If Congress has to enumerate the right before 
it may be protected by any branch of government, these words have no 
meaning.176 And if the judiciary, as a part of the government, cannot 
 171. Id. at 488 (Goldberg, J., concurring). See also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
833, 848 (1992) (“Neither the Bill of Rights nor the specific practices of the States at the time of the 
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment marks the outer limits of the substantive sphere of liberty 
which the Fourteenth Amendment protects.”). 
 172. Raoul Berger, The Ninth Amendment, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 8 (1980), reprinted in 
BARNETT, supra note 116, at 191-92. 
 173. For example, Raoul Berger suggests that if we adopt Justice Goldberg’s view of the 
Ninth Amendment in Griswold v. Connecticut, we “would transform the ninth amendment into a 
bottomless well in which judiciary can dip for the formation of undreamed of ‘rights’ in their 
limitless discretion.” Berger, supra note 173, at 192. See also, BORK, supra note 76 at 8–9. 
 174. If, as Professor Tom McAffee admits, the people are superior to the Constitution, then the 
rights of the people are also superior to the Constitution and remain with the people regardless of 
their expression in the Constitution. See McAffee, supra note 128, at 275. See also HENKIN, THE 
AGE OF RIGHTS, supra note 129, at 86 (“Individual rights, then, are natural, inherent. They cannot be 
taken away, or even suspended. They are not a gift from society, or from any government . . . . they 
are freedoms and entitlements of all men, everywhere, antecedent and superior to government. They 
do not derive from any constitution; they antecede all constitutions.”). 
 175. WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 607 (1985). While the Supreme Court 
generally does not rely on the Declaration of Independence as a legally enforceable document 
standing alone, the Declaration may certainly be used to inform our understanding of what the 
Framers thought they were doing during the process of creating a new government. 
 176. Professor Tom McAffee attempts to reconcile the idea of “inalienable rights” with the 
need for written law protecting those rights. McAffee, supra note 128, at 276–80. Despite the fact 
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protect those unenumerated rights, then those rights either have little, if 
any, substance, or essentially have been alienated contrary to the 
intention of the Framers.177
International human rights law can help to address the concern of 
some scholars who believe that allowing the recognition and protection 
of unenumerated rights opens a Pandora’s Box of limitless judicial 
discretion. If judges take into consideration the existence and scope of a 
right under international human rights law in the context of deciding 
whether such a right exists in our own constitutional jurisprudence, such 
reference can help to shape and limit judges’ abilities to create new rights 
or expand existing rights. For example, if a U.S. federal judge is deciding 
a case involving an asserted right of privacy with respect to family and 
home, that judge may look to international law as reflected in the 
ICCPR,178 and the scope of those rights as they have been defined by 
judges in other countries also parties to the treaty. On the other hand, if 
no such right is expressly mentioned in the U.S. Constitution, and no 
such right can be found in other domestic or international human rights 
laws, a federal judge would be hard-pressed to justify the recognition or 
expansion of such a right. 
But even assuming, arguendo, that the only rights that are part of the 
Constitution and that may be protected by the government are the ones 
expressly mentioned in the Constitution, international law could and 
should be used to help define the contours of those rights that are 
expressly mentioned. In this way, international law would still have a 
role in constitutional interpretation as to the meaning of ambiguous terms 
such as due process, cruel and unusual punishment, and habeas corpus. 
Such usage of international human rights law is consistent with the 
Framers’ use of natural law concepts of individual rights to draft the 
Constitution and their intention that the Constitution continue to be 
interpreted consistently with the United States’ international obligations. 
 c.  Substantive due process. Perhaps because of the uncertainty of 
natural law and the debate regarding the appropriate role and meaning of 
the Ninth Amendment, the U.S. Supreme Court has more recently 
that such rights are “inalienable,” he suggests that such rights may “be granted away in law by the 
people’s design or neglect.” Id. at 280. Not only is this suggestion inconsistent with the ordinary 
meaning of the words used, it also is inconsistent with the Ninth Amendment’s command that the 
unenumerated rights shall not be denied or disparaged. Simeon C.R. McIntosh, On Reading the 
Ninth Amendment: A Reply to Raoul Berger, 28 HOW. L.J. 913, 915 (1985), reprinted in BARNETT, 
supra note 116, at 219, 225. 
 177. McIntosh, supra note 177, at 219, 224. Some scholars may be confusing the existence of 
such rights with the methods chosen to protect them. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 173, at 191. 
(stating that he believes it was left for the states to protect those rights). 
 178. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 17, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 
171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
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grounded unenumerated “fundamental rights” in the concept of 
substantive due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.179
The Court has held that while “[t]he Constitution does not explicitly 
mention any right of privacy . . . one aspect of the ‘liberty’ protected by 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is ‘a right of 
personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy.’”180 
And while the Court has never defined the outer limits of the right of 
privacy, its decisions have extended that right to include a variety of 
personal decisions a person may make without unjustified governmental 
interference such as the right of parents to make decisions about child-
rearing and education,181 and the right of couples to make decisions about 
procreation,182 contraception,183 abortion,184 and marriage.185 In Meyer, 
the Court defined liberty broadly to 
 
denote[] not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of 
an individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations 
of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and 
bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own 
conscience, and generally enjoy those privileges long recognized at 
common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free 
men.186
 
Accordingly, on numerous occasions, the Court has been willing to 
find rights to be protected by the Constitution that are not expressly 
mentioned therein. It has long assumed the role of guarantor of these 
natural or unenumerated rights by way of its power to review the acts of 
the other branches of government and determine whether those acts are 
consistent with higher law principles, whether those rights are grounded 
in natural law, the Ninth Amendment or the Fifth and Fourteenth 
 179. In Meachum v. Fano, Justice Stevens wrote: “I had thought it self-evident that all men 
were endowed by their Creator with liberty as one of the cardinal unalienable rights. It is that basic 
freedom which the Due Process clause protects. . . .” 427 U.S. 215, 230 (1976) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
 180. Carey v. Population Serv. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684 (1977) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113, 152 (1973)). 
 181. See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 
390 (1923). In Prince v. Massachusetts, the Supreme Court stated: “[T]he custody, care and nurture 
of the child resides first in the parents . . . . And it is in recognition of this that [prior Supreme Court] 
decisions have respected the private realm of family life which the state cannot enter.” 321 U.S. 158, 
166 (1944). 
 182. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541–42 (1942). 
 183. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 184. Roe, 410 U.S. at 113 (1973). 
 185. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
 186. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399. 
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Amendments to the Constitution.187
One reason the Court has been willing to protect unenumerated 
rights in more recent years may be the influence of the growing body of 
international human rights law that recognizes certain universal, 
fundamental rights that belong to all persons, regardless of their specific 
expression in the positive domestic law of a state. As discussed in more 
detail below many of these rights are expressed in treaties to which the 
United States is a party, such as the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of Genocide,188 the Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment189 and the 
ICCPR. They are thus part of the supreme law of the land that is to be 
interpreted and applied by the Court. 
 
D.  The Emergence of International Human Rights Law 
 
American notions of individual rights both contributed to the 
development of international human rights law and, more recently, have 
been influenced by that growing body of international law in turn.190 
Accordingly, this section briefly traces the development of international 
human rights law and its influence on U.S. constitutional jurisprudence 
of individual rights. 
 
1.  Evolution from natural law to international human rights law 
 
Like the international law of sovereignty, the international human 
rights law is founded on natural law. However, exactly the opposite of 
early sovereignty theories, early theories of divine and natural law 
focused on universal responsibilities of man rather than rights.191 Several 
historical events, including the decline of feudalism, the expansion of 
commerce, and an emerging middle class, contributed to a growing 
interest in the concept of rights.192 In 1791, Thomas Paine produced THE 
RIGHTS OF MAN, which introduced the specific expression “human 
 187. Hamilton and Jefferson shared the view that it was the function of the courts to defend 
human rights against intrusions by the legislature. BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 138, 
at 52. 
 188. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, Jan. 12, 1951, 78 U.N.T.S. 
277. 
 189. Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, June 26, 1987, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. 
 190. For an interesting discussion of international influence on the early American civil 
liberties movement, see John Fabian Witt, Crystal Eastman and the Internationalist Beginnings of 
American Civil Liberties, 54 DUKE L.J. 705 (2004). 
 191. LAUREN, supra note 82, at 13. 
 192. Id. 
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rights.” 193
Both religious beliefs and moral and political philosophy contributed 
to the development of international human rights.194 One author states it 
thus: “Human rights is a twentieth-century name for what has been 
traditionally known as natural rights or, in a more exhilarating phrase, 
the rights of man.”195 Human rights law is rooted in natural law.196 Some 
scholars have suggested that the very idea of human rights is 
“ineliminably religious.”197 Other scholars have suggested that it is just 
this connection to “higher law” or natural law that has caused some 
scholars and judges to be apprehensive when approaching human rights 
claims.198
 
2.  U.S. participation in the development of international human rights 
 
While the idea of human rights has existed for several centuries, 
modern international human rights law only really developed in a 
concrete form following World War II.199 It found expression in the 
United Nations Charter,200 the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights,201 and subsequent treaties. The U.N. Charter and the Universal 
Declaration gave voice to many of the rights contained in the U.S. Bill of 
Rights on an international level.202
The United States was a leader in the development of international 
 193. THOMAS PAINE, THE RIGHTS OF MAN 18 (New York: Heritage Press, 1961 ed.). See also 
PAUST, supra note 137, at 201. 
 194. LAUREN, supra note 82, at 10-13. 
 195. CRANSTON, supra note 84, at 1. 
 196. HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS, supra note 128, at 1. Although Henkin suggests that “the 
contemporary version does not ground or justify itself in natural law.” Id. at 2. See also CRANSTON, 
supra note 84, at 7; Robert J. Araujo, The Catholic Neo-Scholastic Contribution to Human Rights: 
The Natural Law Foundation, 1 AVE MARIA L. REV. 159, 163 (2003) (“[I]nternational law has a 
strong foundation in the natural law tradition that is very much at the core of international human 
rights law.”). 
 197. Michael Perry, THE IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FOUR INQUIRIES 11–41 (Oxford University 
Press 1998). 
 198. K. Lee Boyd, Are Human Rights Political Questions?, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 277, 285-86 
(2001). 
 199. HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS, supra note 129, at 16. 
 200. The preamble to the U.N. Charter states: “WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS DETERMINED . . . to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and 
worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and 
small . . .U.N. Charter, preamble. The Charter also states that one of its “Purposes and Principles” is 
to promote and encourage “respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.” U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3. See also U.N. Charter 
art. 55–56. 
 201. G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, 71 (1948). 
 202. Bert B. Lockwood, The United Nations Charter and the United States Civil Rights 
Litigation: 1946-1955, 69 IOWA L. REV. 901, 915 (1984). 
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human rights. It hosted the conference at which the United Nations 
Charter was drafted.203 It was one of the five victor countries that 
conducted the Nuremburg trials—the first time individuals were held 
accountable for war crimes before an international criminal tribunal. The 
United States participated in drafting the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, as well as the more detailed International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights.204 While the United States has sometimes 
been reluctant to ratify certain international human rights treaties, such as 
the recent Statute for the International Criminal Court (ICC), it has 
remained deeply involved in the development of international human 
rights norms, including the drafting of the ICC Charter. 
 
3.  The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently used foreign and 
international law throughout its history 
 
While it is clear that the United States government has been an active 
participant in developing the rules of international human rights law, the 
question remains: What impact has that international activity had on 
courts and the development of the law in the United States? As Mr. 
Dorsen, Founder and President of the U.S. Association of Constitutional 
Law, stated in his introductory remarks at the recent Scalia-Breyer 
Discussion regarding the Supreme Court’s use of international and 
foreign law, “[I]t is important to recognize that since the early 19th 
century, Supreme Court cases have relied, without much fuss or fanfare, 
on certain foreign materials.”205 Several scholars have documented the 
Supreme Court’s use of foreign and international legal materials 
throughout its history.206 Accordingly, I do not propose to review that 
 203. JOHN P. HUMPHREY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UNITED NATIONS: A GREAT ADVENTURE 
12-13 (Transnational Publishers 1984). 
 204. In fact, First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt chaired the first Commission on Human Rights 
which adopted the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights. See id. at 4-5. 
 205. Claudio Grossman, Dean of the American University College of Law, Remarks at a 
Discussion between U.S. Supreme Court Justices Antonin Scalia and Stephen Breyer at American 
University College of Law, at 4, http:/domino.american,edu/AU/media/mediarel.nsf/1D265343 
BDC2189785256B810071F2 (last visited January 13, 2005). As examples, Dean Grossman pointed 
to an 1855 case in which the Court said that the English Magna Carta was relevant to the case and a 
1960s case in which the court relied on the so-called English Judges’ Rule. See id. 
 206. PAUST, supra note 137, at 208-24 (documenting Supreme Court references to natural 
rights and human rights in particular); Koh, Constitution and International Law, supra note 114, at 
45-48; Vicki Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance, Engagement, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 109, 110 (2005). See also Jon M. Van Dyke, The Role of Customary International 
Law in Federal and State Court Litigation, 26 UNIV. HAW L. REV. 362-64 (2004); White, supra note 
81, at 727; Rex Glensy, Which Countries Count?: Lawrence v. Texas and the Selection of Foreign 
Persuasive Authority, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 357, 361-87 (2005). 
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entire history here. However, one particularly interesting recent study 
demonstrated that twenty-five percent of the early Supreme Court’s 
docket consisted of cases involving foreign and international issues and 
concluded that the early Supreme Court was in the day-to-day business 
of foreign affairs.207
Dean of Yale Law School, Harold Hongju Koh, suggests that, 
historically, the Supreme Court “has regularly looked to foreign and 
international precedents as an aid to constitutional interpretation in at 
least three situations,” which he calls, “parallel rules,” “empirical light,” 
and “community standard.”208 First, the Court has noted when legal rules 
in the United States “parallel those of other nations, particularly those 
with similar legal and social traditions.”209 Second, “empirical light” 
refers to the fact that the Court “has long considered as relevant and 
informative the way in which foreign courts have applied standards 
roughly comparable to our own constitutional standards in roughly 
comparable circumstances.”210 Third, the Court has considered 
international and foreign legal sources when a U.S constitutional concept 
such as “cruel and unusual” or “due process” by its own terms implicitly 
refers to a community standard.211 Thus, there is ample evidence that the 
Supreme Court has frequently referred to foreign and international 
sources throughout its history and has used these sources to assist in 
interpreting federal statutes, treaties, and the U.S. Constitution. 
 
4.  Implications for the future 
 
The changes in the understanding of the meaning of sovereignty and 
the development of international human rights law described above have 
far-reaching implications for nation-states such as the United States. As 
Professor Reisman has stated, “[b]y shifting the fulcrum of the system 
from the protection of sovereigns to the protection of the people, 
[international human rights law] works qualitative changes in virtually 
every component.”212 This new concept of sovereignty even affects the 
relationship between national and international law. Because 
international law acts to create and define a sovereign state and its duty 
 207. Ariel N. Lavinbuk, Rethinking Early Judicial Involvement in Foreign Affairs: An 
Empirical Study of the Supreme Court’s Docket, 114 YALE L. J. 855, 861, 874 (2005). Of course, not 
all of these cases involved individual or human rights issues, but certainly some of them did. Id. 
 208. Koh, Constitution and International Law, supra note 114, at 45. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. at 47 (quoting Justice Breyer’s dissent in Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 997 
(1999)). 
 211. Koh, Constitution and International Law, supra note 114, at 46. 
 212. Reisman, supra note 102, at 872. 
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to protect its people, the actions of any particular state carried out in 
fulfillment of that duty must be measured by both international and 
national law standards. It has long been established that national law may 
not be invoked to justify violations of international law.213 If the 
international law concept of sovereignty is used to assert federal power, 
as has been done by the Supreme Court in the cases cited above, then it 
also should be used to inform the meaning of limits on sovereignty 
suggested by international human rights norms.214 As Professor Ronald 
Brand has stated, “If the role of the sovereign is to provide security, and 
strengthening the international rule of law results in increased security, 
then the role of the sovereign must be to strengthen the international rule 
of law.”215 This mandate applies to all branches of government—the 
legislative, executive, and judiciary. Thus, U.S. courts, as one branch of 
the federal government, share in the sovereign duty to protect and are 
therefore derelict in their duties if they do not judge the lawfulness of 
government action by both national and international law standards, 
including international human rights law. 
 
V.  OBJECTIONS TO THE USE OF FOREIGN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
Despite this frequent use of foreign and international law by the 
Supreme Court, Justice Scalia remains unconvinced of the merits of 
looking to foreign law in particular. He has two responses to the 
argument that the Framers of the U.S. Constitution were influenced by 
foreign law. First, he argues that the Framers “didn’t have a whole lot of 
respect for many of the rules in European countries.”216 However, he 
does admit that the Framers “used a lot of foreign law,” which is 
evidenced by discussions of the Swiss and German systems in the 
Federalist Papers.217 He further states that while foreign law may be 
 213. See id. at 874. See also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 27, May 23, 1969, 
Hein’s No. KAV 2424. 
 214. See Christenson, supra note 128, at 29–30. 
 215. Brand, supra note 105, at 1696-97. 
 216. AU Transcript, supra note 20, at 5. 
 217. Id. at 8. See also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921, n.11 (1997). See also the 
statement in Federalist Paper No. 63 which has been attributed to either Alexander Hamilton or 
James Madison, in which the author gives two reasons why the U.S. should pay attention to other 
nations: “An attention to the judgment of other nations is important to every Government for two 
reasons: The one is, that, independently of the merits of any particular plan or measure, it is 
desirable, on various accounts, that it should appear to other nations as the offspring of a wise and 
honorable policy; The second is, that in doubtful cases, particularly where the national councils may 
be warped by some strong passion or momentary interest, the presumed or known opinion of the 
impartial world may be the best guide that can be followed. What has not America lost with her want 
of character with foreign nations? And how many errors and follies would she not have avoided, if 
the justice and propriety of her measures had, in every instance, been previously tried by the light in 
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useful in devising a constitution, it is not useful in interpreting one.218 
Justice Scalia argues that when interpreting the U.S. Constitution, the 
appropriate judicial task is to understand what it meant when it was 
adopted and that the meaning of the Constitution does not change over 
time.219
To perform the task of determining the Constitution’s original 
meaning, Justice Scalia admits that one must look to foreign sources to 
determine what the constitution meant when it was drafted; however, he 
would limit that inquiry to “Old English law.”220 Although the Federalist 
Papers are full of references to foreign law and the law of nations,221 
Justice Scalia only allows for reliance on “Old English law” because 
many constitutional phrases, such as due process, are taken from “Old 
English law.” 222 However, English law was not formed in isolation any 
more than American law has been. It was influenced by Roman law, 
other European law and the law of nations.223 Moreover, many of the 
Framers were aware of and influenced by the French Revolution and the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man.224 Thus, even under an originalist 
theory of interpretation, in order to fully understand what the Framers 
had in mind, it is likely that we need to look beyond just “Old English 
law” to other foreign systems to understand what these words meant 
when the Constitution was drafted.225
Justice Scalia ascribes to a textualist theory of interpretation, which 
he has described as follows: “A text should not be construed strictly, and 
it should not be construed leniently; it should be construed reasonably, to 
which they would probably appear to the unbiased part of mankind?” THE FEDERALIST NO. 63. 
 218. AU Transcript, supra note 20, at 8. See also Printz, 521 U.S. at 921, n.11 (“We think 
such comparative analysis inappropriate to the task of interpreting a constitution, though it was of 
course quite relevant to the task of writing one.”). 
 219. AU Transcript, supra note 20, at 8. 
 220. In Atkins, Justice Scalia cited to Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England in 
making his case that the execution of mildly retarded persons would not have been considered cruel 
and unusual punishment in 1791. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 340 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See 
also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 626 (“It is of course true that we share a common history with 
the United Kingdom, and that we often consult English sources when asked to discern the meaning 
of a constitutional text written against the backdrop of 18th century English law and legal thought.”). 
 221. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 3 (John Jay) (“It is of high importance to the peace of 
America, that she observe the law of nations towards all these Powers.”). 
 222. AU Transcript, supra note 20, at 8. Interestingly, Justice Scalia would look to English 
law to determine the meaning of sovereignty as it was understood at the time the constitution was 
drafted. Id. at 25. 
 223. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 53 (Wayne 
Morrison ed., Cavedish 2001) (1765-69) (stating that the law of nations has been “adopted in [its] 
full extent by the common law and is held to be a part of the law of the land.”). 
 224. See Alford, supra note 127, at 656-58. 
 225. See id. at 645–54. 
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contain all this fairly means.”226 In order to determine what constitutes a 
“reasonable” interpretation, it is likely that an interpreter will consider 
common methods of interpretation such as the ordinary meaning of a 
word, the intent of the Framers, and the context in which the words are 
used, among other possible sources of information. Because the Framers 
of the Constitution were influenced by natural law and the law of 
nations, using this method of interpretation opens the door to consider 
such sources in determining what interpretation is reasonable. 
In any event, a static originalist theory of the Constitution is a 
bankrupt method of interpretation for those who were not included in the 
early Constitutional experiment. As Professor Louis Henkin rightly 
points out, the social compact made at the time of the founding of our 
nation was made by only a small portion of the inhabitants of the United 
States.227 Only property owners were allowed to vote. Poor men, slaves, 
and women were excluded. Therefore, the original social compact lacks a 
certain amount of legitimacy for these groups. While the Framers of the 
Constitution laid a very worthwhile foundation, why should today’s 
citizens be bound by the values of a minority group that lived over 200 
years ago? As Henkin has argued, “[t]he Constitution as social compact 
requires a contemporary compact by the people today.”228 The continuing 
legitimacy of the Constitution may depend on whether it accurately 
expresses the will and values of the people today. 
Using international human rights law to inform the meaning of the 
Constitution today may actually increase that constitutional legitimacy 
because the United States has been a leader in helping to create that law 
and, thus, that law is more likely to reflect our contemporary values. 
International human rights law is inclusive of all the groups mentioned 
above who were excluded from the original social compact. Today, there 
are numerous international treaties specifically designed to guard against 
racial discrimination229 and to protect the rights of women.230
Justice Scalia also is concerned that using foreign law is dangerous 
because U.S. judges will not be familiar with the surrounding 
jurisprudence such that they are likely to misunderstand the foreign 
rules.231 While this might be a danger, it would seem that the answer is 
 226. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 23 (Amy Gutmann ed., Princeton 
University Press 1997). 
 227. HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS, supra note 129, at 91. 
 228. Id. at 103. 
 229. See, e.g., Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 4660 
U.N.T.S. 195, 5 I.L.M. 352 (1966). 
 230. See, e.g., Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 
1249 U.N.T.S. 13, 19 I.L.M. 33 (1980). 
 231. AU Transcript, supra note 20, at 11. See also Posner, supra note 29, at 41–42. 
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not to discard the use of foreign law, but to be better educated about it. It 
is really the job of the attorneys in any given case to educate the court 
about any applicable law and that includes any relevant or useful foreign 
or international law.232
Furthermore, Justice Scalia’s objection to references to international 
law in recent cases such as Atkins and Lawrence is inconsistent with his 
acceptance of the supremacy of U.S. treaty law. The United States is a 
party to the ICCPR, which makes the ICCPR part of the supreme law of 
the land.233 In joining the ICCPR, the United States undertook an 
obligation to take any steps necessary to ensure to all individuals within 
its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights set forth in the 
ICCPR.234 Article 7 of the ICCPR states that “[n]o one shall be subjected 
to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”235 
Prior to the Atkins decision, the Human Rights Committee, a body 
created by the ICCPR to monitor compliance with the Convention,236 
expressed regret that the United States did not protect mentally retarded 
persons from the death penalty.237 While the United States has made a 
reservation to the ICCPR with respect to the imposition of the death 
penalty, there is some doubt regarding whether its reservation is valid as 
a matter of treaty law.238 But even if the reservation is valid as a legal 
matter, the widespread acceptance among the nations of the world of the 
treaty’s ban on the death penalty is certainly evidence of evolving 
standards of decency and should inform our view of acceptable treatment 
of mentally retarded persons. 
In addition, the European Union’s amicus brief establishing 
overwhelming disapproval for the imposition of the death penalty for 
 232. Justice Breyer has invited law professors and lawyers to do exactly that. Justice Stephen 
Breyer, Keynote Address at the Meeting of the American Society of International Law: The 
Supreme Court and the New International Law (April 4, 2003), in 97 AM. SOC’Y. INT’L. PROC. 265 
(2003) [hereinafter Breyer]. 
 233. U.S. CONST. art. VI. When the U.S. Senate gave its advice and consent to the ICCPR, it 
did so subject to a number of reservations, understandings, and declarations. Of relevance here, the 
Senate’s advice and consent was subject to the declaration that Articles 1 through 27 of the ICCPR 
are not self-executing. See S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 95-2 (1992), 31 I.L.M. 648. 
 234. ICCPR, supra note 179, at art. 7. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. at art. 28. 
 237. Report of the Human Rights Committee, ¶ 281, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. 
Doc. 1/50/40 (Oct. 3, 1995). 
 238. See, e.g., General Comment adopted by the Human Rights Committee, under 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art 40, para. 4, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 
171, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev. 1/Add.6 (11 Nov. 1994). William A. Schabas, Invalid Reservations 
to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Is the United States Still a Party?, 21 
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 277 (1995). The United States Supreme Court has never addressed the issue of 
the reservation’s validity. The point is now largely moot in light of the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Atkins and Roper. 
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crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders provides evidence of 
custom and general principles of law. Because international law is part of 
our law,239 the Supreme Court had a duty to examine the practices of the 
world community to determine whether those practices may establish an 
international rule that is binding on the United States.240
In his recent confirmation hearings, Chief Justice Roberts expressed 
concern about the use of foreign law, suggesting that it does not limit 
judicial discretion because “you can find anything you want . . . . As 
somebody said in a different context, looking at foreign law for support 
is like looking out over a crowd and picking out your friends.”241 While 
Justice Roberts has expressed a valid concern about the use of foreign 
law generally, where there is virtually unanimous consensus among the 
rest of the world condemning an action like the imposition of the death 
penalty on juveniles or the mentally retarded, his point is not as well 
taken. 
As in Atkins, the majority’s reference to international law in 
Lawrence was entirely appropriate. First, references in Lawrence to non-
U.S. sources were made to rebut claims made by other justices in similar 
cases in order to establish equal treatment of the issue. The majority in 
Lawrence used foreign and international law to rebut Chief Justice 
Burger’s claims regarding the historical condemnation of homosexual 
practices in Judeo-Christian moral and ethical standards in Bowers v. 
Hardwick. 242 Thus, the majority was not doing anything that the Court 
had not done before. 
Second, such references were appropriate because the United States 
is bound by international treaty obligations to respect the right of privacy 
in one’s home and to provide for equal protection of the law. In these 
regards, Article 17 of the ICCPR provides that “[n]o one shall be 
subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, 
home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour or 
reputation,” and that “[e]veryone has the right to the protection of the 
law against such interference or attacks.”243 Article 26 of the ICCPR 
further provides that “[a]ll persons are equal before the law and are 
entitled without discrimination to the equal protection of the law.”244 
Even Justice Scalia should be willing to admit that ratified treaty 
 239. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). 
 240. In a recent speech to the American Society of International Law, Justice Breyer suggested 
that many of the justices on the Supreme Court would be receptive to such a task, but require 
assistance from the lawyers who brief the Court. Breyer, supra note 233. 
 241. Roberts, supra note 4. 
 242. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196–97 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
 243. ICCPR, supra note 179, at art 17. 
 244. Id. at art 26. 
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obligations ought to inform our understanding of comparable rights 
protected by the Constitution. 
A misperception may exist that because the U.S. Senate declared 
articles 1-27 of the ICCPR to be non-self-executing, the entire treaty is 
not enforceable by U.S. courts and therefore should not be used by U.S. 
courts in their decision-making. While the self-executing treaty doctrine 
does prevent litigants from bringing a claim based on the non-self-
executing portions of a treaty, the self-executing treaty doctrine does not 
bar courts from taking into account the United States’ treaty obligations 
altogether.245 When the President of the United States signs a treaty and 
two-thirds of the Senators give their consent to that treaty, the United 
States has expressed its political will that the United States is in 
agreement with the treaty’s statements regarding international rights and 
duties. A ratified treaty creates binding international legal obligations for 
the United States even if portions of it are not directly enforceable in 
U.S. courts. The treaty becomes part of the Supreme Law of the Land 
under the Supremacy Clause and will trump inconsistent state laws. U.S. 
courts have recognized that even when a treaty contemplates further 
action by the other branches of government, “the judicial branch should 
certainly attempt to reflect in its decision making the spirit as well as the 
letter of an international agreement to which the United States is a 
party.”246
The federal courts have long stated that they will not assume that 
Congress intends to violate the United States’ international 
obligations.247 Accordingly, where there are competing interpretations of 
a federal statute and a treaty to which the U.S. is a party, the courts will 
adopt the interpretation that attempts to reconcile the two.248 U.S. courts 
should likewise use the language of a treaty to which the United States is 
a party to inform the understanding of individual rights under the 
Constitution and choose an interpretation that reconciles the two 
whenever possible. Doing so will assist the United States in avoiding 
violations of its international obligations.249 It is also consistent with the 
 245. PAUST, supra note 137, at 78–79, 361-62; Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Role of the United 
States Senate Concerning “Self-Executing” and “Non-Self-Executing” Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 515, 532 (1991). See also Francisco Forrest Martin, The Constitution and Human Rights: The 
International Legal Constructionist Approach to Ensuring the Protection of Human Rights, 1 FIU L. 
REV. 71, 80–85 (2006) (criticizing the non-self-executing treaty doctrine). 
 246. Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, 917 F.2d 278, 
296 (7th Cir. 1990) (Cudahy, J., concurring), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 941 (1991). 
 247. Murray v. Schooner Charming Besty, 6 U.S. 64 (1804). 
 248. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888). 
 249. Professor John Quigley argues that during the nineteenth century, U.S. courts were more 
likely to apply treaty-based rights, but that practice has changed in the twentieth century to the 
detriment of the United States’ international obligations. John Quigley, Toward More Effective 
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democratic will as expressed by the legislative and executive branches 
when they ratified the treaty. 
Additionally, the United States is bound by any relevant customary 
international law separate and apart from its treaty obligations.250 Despite 
this long-established principle, some scholars and judges are 
uncomfortable with the application of customary international law, 
perhaps because customary international rules are not written “positive” 
laws, or because they can be vague and rest on diffuse sources that are 
hard to find. 251 Treaties often contain very vague and broadly worded 
obligations as well, yet they are still considering binding “law.” 
Furthermore, while it is laudable that the law be known and available to 
any interested person, difficulty in finding the law cannot be 
determinative of its character as law. And while it is true that customary 
international law often cannot be found in one place like a treaty, the 
rules of customary international law are often written down in diplomatic 
correspondence, executive orders, and similar documents. In fact, the 
U.S. government has often made public statements officially accepting 
the binding nature of certain rules of customary international law that 
have been codified in treaties which the United States has not ratified, 
such as the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties252 and the U.N. 
Convention on the Law of the Sea.253 Some judges and scholars also 
have expressed concern about the political foundations of customary 
international law, believing that is not well grounded because it is not 
Judicial Implementation of Treaty-Based Rights, 29 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 552, 581 (2006). 
 250. Beharry v. Reno, 183 F. Supp. 2d 584, 597–99 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). Customary international 
law is commonly defined as “general practice [of states] accepted as law.” See, e.g., ICJ, supra note 
7, at art. 38(1)(b). See also supra notes 12 & 14. 
 251. TRIMBLE, supra note 12, at 187. 
 252. See, e.g., ROVINE, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1973, 
307, 482–83 (1974). See also Maria Frankowska, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
Before United States Courts, 28 VA. J. INT’L L. 281, 299–302 (1988); Robert Dalton, The Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties: Consequences for the United States in The Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties: The Consequences of Participation and Nonparticipation, 78 AM. SOC’Y 
INT’L L. PROC. 270, 277–79 (1984); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES §§ 312, 325 (1987); Chubb & Son v. Asiana Airlines, 214 F.3d 301, 308 (2d Cir. 
2000) (“The United States recognizes the Vienna Convention as a codification of customary 
international law.”). 
 253. See, e.g., Amerada Hess Shipping v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421, 424 (1987), rev’d 
on other grounds, 488 U.S. 428 (1989) (“Argentina is a signatory to the Law of the Sea Convention 
and the United States has endorsed the relevant sections of it.”); Accession to the 1982 Law of the 
Sea Convention and Ratification of the 1994 Agreement Amending Part XI of the Law of the Sea 
Convention: Hearings before the Senate Environment and Public Works Comm., 103d Cong. 39 
(2004) (testimony of John F. Turner, Assistant Secretary of State, Oceans and International 
Environmental and Scientific Affairs) (“At home, President Reagan’s 1983 Oceans Policy Statement 
directed the United States to abide by the non-deep sea bed provisions of the Convention. Abroad, 
the United States has worked both diplomatically and operationally to promote the Convention as 
reflective of customary international law.”). 
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expressly made the law of the land in the Constitution and is not 
approved by the Senate or Congress more generally.254 While it is true 
that the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution only mentions treaties and 
not customary international law, the Constitution does take into account 
customary international law in at least one other place, i.e., its reference 
to offenses against the laws of nations in Article I.255 Furthermore, the 
Executive Branch, which is charged with taking a primary role in foreign 
affairs, is daily involved in the creation of the rules of customary 
international law through its practices and pronouncements. Thus, it is 
perfectly appropriate for U.S. courts to continue to ascertain and apply 
customary international law just as they have for more than two 
centuries. 
A similar objection that has been raised with respect to the use of 
foreign legal materials is that foreign legal materials have no democratic 
provenance or connection to the U.S. legal system and thus lack 
democratic accountability.256 Justice Breyer responds to this concern by 
stating that the court relies on many extrinsic sources in constitutional 
interpretation which lack a democratic base, including the work of legal 
scholars.257 Thus, using foreign or international materials is no worse. 
More importantly, however, he points out that transnational law is 
created by the interaction of many constituencies, such as the interested 
public, affected groups, specialists, legislatures, and others.258 “That is 
the democratic process in action.”259 Persons and groups in the United 
States participate in this process, particularly through involvement in 
nongovernmental organizations.260 The United States, as the most 
powerful state in the international system, has a predominant role in 
creating the rules of international law, whether by negotiating and 
drafting treaties or by its conduct leading to the creation of customary 
international law. Thus, with respect to international law, the United 
States’ legislative and executive branches both have a role in creating the 
rules and can be held accountable for their actions in this regard. 
 254. TRIMBLE, supra note 12, at 187. 
 255. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. 
 256. Posner, supra note 29, at 42; J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Use of International Law in 
Judicial Decisions, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 423, 425–26 (2004); Roger P. Alford, Federal 
Courts, International Tribunals, and the Continuum of Deference, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 675, 785-86 
(2003). 
 257. AU Transcript, supra note 20, at 26. 
 258. Breyer, supra note 233. 
 259. Id. 
 260. See Koh, Constitution and International Law, supra note 114, at 55-57 (listing the 
involvement in the “transnational legal process” of “litigants, activists, publicists, and academic 
commentators” as well as nongovernmental organizations); see also Steve Charnovitz, 
Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 348 (2006). 
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Thus, concerns that anti-democratic processes may influence U.S. 
judges rings much truer with respect to foreign legal materials than with 
respect to international materials, because the democratically elected 
bodies and other groups in the United States participate in the formation 
of international legal rules. Furthermore, the United States can further 
alleviate anti-democratic concerns by being a full and vigorous 
participant in developing transnational law in the future.261
The United States may even influence foreign legal materials to the 
extent that foreign legislatures and judges take into account what other 
countries are doing when fashioning their own rules. Because the United 
States is the most powerful country in the world in the present time and 
because historically, it has a long history of democratic governance and 
protection of individual rights, it is likely that the United States is one of 
the countries whose practices will be considered.262
As a general proposition, however, international law does have more 
legitimacy in the U.S. legal system than foreign law because the U.S. has 
a greater role in shaping international law than foreign law.263 As a result, 
there are different considerations at work with respect to the use of 
foreign law in constitutional interpretation. In the Knight v. Florida death 
penalty case, Justice Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion in which he 
suggested some standards for the use of foreign law. 264 He suggests the 
use of foreign law is appropriate in two situations. First, it is appropriate 
when there exists a roughly comparable question and there is a 
transnational or global aspect to the case, there are shared standards, or 
world opinion is implicated. Second, the use of foreign law is appropriate 
when roughly comparable legal standards exist, i.e., when the external or 
foreign norms resonate internally. Justice Breyer suggests that this last 
situation is most likely to occur with respect to Europe and its former 
colonies because of our shared human rights heritage.265
These suggestions are worthy of further exploration to determine 
whether “roughly comparable questions” or “roughly comparable legal 
standards” can be identified with some confidence. However, use of 
foreign law should be approached with particular caution. A specific 
 261. See id. at 56-57. 
 262. Some may take issue with the United States’ current reputation as a leader in the area of 
individual rights in light of recent events arising from the detention of persons in connection with the 
fight against terrorism. 
 263. Justice Scalia’s criticisms of the Supreme Court’s use of foreign law therefore has more 
legitimacy than any criticism of the use of international law. 
 264. Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 997-98 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 265. Similarly, Professor Rex Glensey suggests the U.S. should only look to “genuine liberal 
democracies” that share our societal values. Rex D. Glensey, Which Countries Count?: Lawrence v. 
Texas and the Selection of Foreign Persuasive Authority, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 357, 412 (2005). 
  
1] BURYING OUR CONSTITUION IN THE SAND? 47 
 
nation’s laws reflect that nation’s history, culture, and legal system.266 
Thus, any one nation’s legal rules are likely to be of limited value to 
another nation with a different history, culture and legal system. 
However, if a worldwide survey is conducted and many or most nations 
in the world have adopted a particular legal rule, that rule will reflect a 
consensus derived from many different cultures and legal systems and 
will likely be more useful and persuasive. 
Finally, persons on both sides of the debate agree that part of what is 
driving this debate regarding the use of international and foreign law is a 
concern that such law will be used by judges in an unprincipled manner 
to support the judges’ personal viewpoints.267 Justice Breyer responds to 
this concern by arguing that a good way to counter the possibility of 
judges imposing their own moral values is for judges to look outside 
themselves and see how society is dealing with the issue – including 
looking to foreign societies and international law.268 Moreover, it may be 
argued that international law is a more effective interpretive tool than 
many other external sources a judge may use because rules of 
international law are “a product of years of distillation of principles 
formed through international consensus,” that are evidenced by state 
practice and agreements that articulate the relevant principles.269 As a 
result, reliance on a rule of international law may actually reduce an 
individual judge’s subjectivity when interpreting constitutional 
provisions.270
For all these reasons, it is incorrect to suggest that references to 
international and foreign law have no place in U.S. Constitutional 
interpretation. 
 
VI.  WHY SHOULD THE SUPREME COURT CONTINUE TO USE 
INTERNATIONAL AND FOREIGN LAW? 
 
Thus far, this article has established the political and historical bases 
for the incorporation of international law and to a lesser extent, foreign 
law, principles into U.S. constitutional jurisprudence and has described 
 266. See James Allan & Grant Huscroft, Constitutional Rights Coming Home to Roost? Rights 
Internationalism in American Courts, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 14-27 (2006) (contrasting U.S. 
rights-based constitutionalism with those of other common law jurisdictions). 
 267. AU Transcript, supra note 20, at 9. 
 268. AU Transcript, supra note 20, at 10. 
 269. See Tamara Hughlett, International Law: The Use of International Law as a Guide to 
Interpretation of the United States Constitution, 45 OKLA. L. REV. 169, 182 (1992). Similarly, 
Professor Vicki Jackson has suggested that “[l]ooking to foreign law may also enhance judicial 
decision making by expanding opportunities for ethical engagement with the views of those having 
equivalent responsibility and aspiring to similar impartiality.” Jackson, supra note 207, at 118. 
 270. See Hughlett, supra note 270, at 182. 
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both the historical and recent use of international and foreign law by the 
U.S. Supreme Court. It also has responded to the concerns of critics. This 
section provides some reasons why the Supreme Court should continue 
to use international and foreign law in the future. 
The most important reason supporting the Supreme Court’s 
continued use of international law is that the Constitution requires it. As 
noted above, the Constitution makes treaties part of the supreme law of 
the land on par with federal statutes.271 When the political branches have 
come together and agreed to sign and ratify a treaty, the Supreme Court 
should give deference to the judgment of the other branches as to the 
rules of international law expressed in that treaty and should assist the 
United States in complying with its treaty obligations by adopting an 
interpretation that is consistent with those treaty obligations whenever 
possible.272
Even when the Constitution does not expressly incorporate 
international law, federal statutes, such as in the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act273 or the Alien Tort Statute, may do so.274 It also seems 
fairly uncontroversial that when the U.S. Supreme Court is interpreting a 
treaty, it should take into account the practice of states who are also 
parties to the treaty and decisions of their courts interpreting the treaty 
because such evidence would be relevant and useful evidence of the 
meaning of the treaty.275 Thus, the Supreme Court should continue to use 
international and foreign legal sources when it is required to do so by the 
Constitution or by statute. 
Likewise, the U.S. Supreme Court must continue to ascertain and 
apply customary international law principles when called for by the 
Constitution or by federal statute. For example, the Court may need to 
consider customary international law pursuant to the Constitution’s grant 
of authority to Congress to define and punish offenses against the law of 
nations,276 as it did in United States v. Smith.277
 271. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2; Whitney v. Robinson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888). 
 272. Of course, if the other branches of government entered into a treaty that denied a 
constitutionally protected right such as a right to a jury trial as was the case in Reid v. Covert, 354 
U.S. 1 (1957), the Court would be bound to ignore the inconsistent treaty obligation. 
 273. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2000). 
 274. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2005). Other examples of incorporation of the law of nations or 
international law into U.S. statutes may be found in the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 
U.S.C.A. § 1350 (West 2006); Internee of Belligerent Nation, 18 U.S.C.A. § 756; Interned 
Belligerent Nationals, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3058 (West 2006); Departure of Vessel Forbidden in Aid of 
Neutrality, 18 U.S.C.A. § 967 (West 2006); Destruction or Misuse of Vessel by Person in Charge, 18 
U.S.C.A. § 2274 (West 2006); Compelling Foreign Vessels to Depart, 22 U.S.C.A. § 462 (West 
2006); Condemnation of Piratical Vessels, 33 U.S.C.A. § 384 (West 2006); Seizure and 
Condemnation of Vessels Fitted Out for Piracy, 33 U.S.C.A. § 385 (West 2006). 
 275. See, e.g., Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530 (1991). 
 276. U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 8. 
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The recent case of Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain provides a timely 
example of a statutory requirement to consider customary international 
law. In Sosa, the Supreme Court was required by the Alien Tort Statute 
to determine whether particular conduct constituted a tort under the law 
of nations.278 The Supreme Court affirmed that it was required to 
ascertain and apply a modern-day understanding of international torts, at 
least where the norm of international character is accepted by the 
civilized world and defined with specificity.279
Use of international treaty law and the customary international law 
of human rights to inform U.S. constitutional rights jurisprudence also 
can be justified under and reconciled with many classic theories of 
constitutional interpretation.280 From an originalist perspective, such 
usage is appropriate because the Founding Fathers were heavily 
influenced by foreign and international law and incorporated some of 
these sources and ideas into the Constitution (although a “hard” 
originalist might only allow for international law as it existed at the time 
of the writing of the Constitution).281 A natural law proponent should be 
open to using international human rights law to inform U.S. individual 
rights jurisprudence because of the shared natural law foundations and 
the mutual influence of U.S. law and international law on one another. 
From a structural majoritarianism perspective, it may be argued that 
appropriate use of foreign and international law where it has been created 
and approved by the political branches of the federal government 
demonstrates proper deference to those branches. On the other hand, an 
interpretive majoritarianism view might use present-day concepts of 
sovereignty and international human rights to facilitate our understanding 
of the meaning of a “living” constitution that changes over time in 
response to societal changes. Finally, a pragmatic approach might 
encourage examination of foreign legal experiences to better understand 
the consequences of different legal solutions for common legal 
problems.282
 277. 18 U.S. 153 (1820). 
 278. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
 279. Id. at 724-25. 
 280. See Alford, supra note 127, at 644 (Professor Alford discusses four types of classic 
constitutional theories – originalism, natural law, majoritarianism (both structural and interpretive), 
and pragmatism). See also MICHAEL J. GERHARDT ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: ARGUMENTS 
AND PERSPECTIVES §§ 1.101–1.104 (LexisNexis 2d ed. 2000) (providing an historical overview of 
constitutional theories). 
 281. SUNSTEIN, supra note 80, at 173. (Professor Sunstein distinguishes between “hard” 
originalism, which makes a historical inquiry to discover specific answers to specific questions and 
“soft” originalism, which makes the historical inquiry to discover constraining but flexible 
standards.). 
 282. An example of this approach may be found in Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion in 
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Moreover, using international and foreign law will assist the U.S. 
government in carrying out its duty to protect the people. Modern 
conceptions of sovereignty require that the sovereign state take seriously 
its responsibility to protect its citizens.283 Because “[h]uman rights are 
rights” and not aspirations, the government has an obligation to protect 
such rights.284 While many international human rights are said to be 
universal and do not differ substantively in different national legal 
systems, they depend on national governments for their protection.285 If 
the state is not providing a level of protection for human rights that has 
been widely adopted elsewhere in the world, perhaps it is time for the 
state to reexamine why this is the case. Such an examination does not 
necessarily require a change in the law, as there may be important and 
justifiable reasons that a state has chosen a particular legal rule, (such as 
competing human rights values), but at least requiring that examination 
could force a state to confront its laws and practices and have to justify 
them to its own polity and to the world.286
Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court should take international human 
rights norms into account because it is good foreign relations policy. 
Taking international human rights norms into account serves foreign 
relations purposes by allowing the United States to maintain a position of 
leadership in international affairs, earn a “good” reputation, encourage 
good human rights practices in other countries, promote conditions 
conducive to trade, and encourage peace and stability. 
In sum, the U.S. Supreme Court should continue to consider 
international and foreign legal materials in its work because it is 
sometimes required to do so by the constitution or by federal statute, 
because it increases the legitimacy of the court’s jurisprudence, and 
because it is good foreign relations policy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 977 (1997). 
 283. As Thomas Jefferson stated, governments are instituted “to secure these rights.” HENKIN, 
THE AGE OF RIGHTS, supra note 129, at 87. 
 284. Id. at 3. 
 285. Id. at 2, 17. 
 286. On the other hand, if there is little agreement in international law regarding the prevailing 
human rights standards, international law would not be so helpful and U.S. justices would be freer to 
form their own conclusions about the parameters of a particular right based solely on our own 
constitutional history. 
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VII.  HOW SHOULD INTERNATIONAL LAW BE USED BY THE SUPREME 
COURT IN THE FUTURE? 
 
At the outset of the article, I noted that one criticism of the Supreme 
Court’s use of foreign and international law is that there is a lack of 
guidelines or standards as to when use of such sources is appropriate. I 
believe this criticism is valid. While some attempts have been made to 
offer such guidelines, they remain incomplete. Accordingly, in this final 
section, I will offer some additional ideas for guidelines or standards that 
may be useful in assessing the appropriateness of the use of foreign and 
international law sources by the Supreme Court in the future. 
Before embarking on that endeavor, however, I wish to offer one 
caveat. Inherent in the United States’ tripartite system of government is a 
certain reliance on the wisdom and integrity of the judges who sit on the 
federal bench. They are appointed for life in part because we expect them 
to act as checks on the other branches of government without fear of 
retaliation. On a daily basis, they are asked to interpret ambiguous laws, 
whether they be domestic or international. This system allows the judges 
a certain level of discretion. Thus, no absolute or rigid guidelines for the 
use of international or foreign law are possible or even desirable. 
Justice Scalia has complained, however, that there is a lack of 
international consensus on many legal rules and that the U.S. Supreme 
Court lacks criteria to assist in deciding when and which of these foreign 
rules to use. This criticism is a potentially troubling one, but no more so 
than Justice Scalia’s concerns with respect to the use of any external 
source in constitutional interpretation. As both Justices Scalia and Breyer 
point out, using international or foreign law is similar to using any other 
external source, such as legislative history, in interpreting a vague or 
ambiguous constitutional term or phrase.287 The court has been able to 
successfully use legislative history when it has found such history to be 
persuasive or useful. In this regard, Justice Breyer argues that the 
Supreme Court cites many sources in its jurisprudence and that the main 
guideline for using these external sources is their usefulness.288 Likewise, 
it does not seem like an insurmountable hurdle for the justices to devise 
some loose guidelines for the use of international and foreign law in their 
jurisprudence.289 Set forth below are a few suggestions in this regard. 
 287. AU Transcript, supra note 20, at 7, 13. 
 288. AU Transcript, supra note 20, at 6. 
 289. In fact, the Honorable Patricia Wald, formerly the Chief Judge of the United States Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, has stated that American judges “are used to making 
judgment calls on the caliber of the courts and even sometimes of the individual judge authors whose 
decisions they decide to cite or rely upon.” Patricia M. Wald, The Use of International Law in the 
American Adjudicative Process, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 431, 440 (2004). They also “are in the 
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A.  International and Foreign Law as an Interpretive Aid 
 
First, international and foreign law may be used as an interpretive aid 
when the language of the Constitution standing alone does not answer a 
question. Where the text of the Constitution is perfectly clear (e.g., the 
necessary age of thirty-five to become President of the United States),290 
there usually is no need to consider extrinsic sources. However, in many 
cases already discussed herein, the text is not perfectly clear on its face. 
Phrases like liberty, due process, and cruel and unusual punishment all 
invite interpretation and explanation. In such cases, it has been common 
for the Supreme Court to look to external sources to aid in its 
interpretation of these vague or ambiguous phrases. International law, 
particularly international human rights norms, may be treated as an 
external source to be used in interpretation of vague or ambiguous 
terms.291 As demonstrated above, it is particularly appropriate to turn to 
international human rights law as an interpretive tool given the common 
historical and theoretical foundations of U.S. individual rights and 
international human rights law. 
Legal positivists might object to the use of international law in this 
way because they would limit themselves to “formal sources of law, 
[e.g.,] those formalized precepts and mandates which have been 
promulgated or issued by a legislature, a constitutional convention, a 
court, or an administrative agency.”292 Although treaties fit the definition 
of positive law, many other sources of international law may not. The 
problem with limiting legal decision-makers exclusively to such formal 
sources of law is that those sources do not answer every question.293 
Positive laws always contain ambiguities and gaps. In such cases, what 
means are available to legal decision-makers to resolve these questions? 
Legal positivists have struggled to answer this question.294 Using 
international human rights law to inform U.S. Constitutional 
jurisprudence can help to solve this dilemma.295
habit of making judicious selection of the precedents in the context of the court and the judges that 
write them. And I would trust them to do so in the case of foreign court judgments as well.” Id. 
 290. U.S. CONST. art. II. 
 291. See Christenson, supra note 128, at 4-6, 16, 20. 
 292. BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 138, at 346. 
 293. See id. at 347. 
 294. See Bodenheimer’s description of possible solutions proposed by John Austin and Hans 
Kelsen, neither of which appears to be satisfactory even to themselves. See id. at 347–49. 
 295. One scholar has argued that at least some U.S courts have been willing to use provisions 
of the U.N. Charter to “find” the U.S. Constitution, i.e., to redefine the due process and equal 
protection clauses to reflect antiracial discrimination norms found in the U.N. Charter. Lockwood, 
supra note 203, at 902. 
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This is not a new idea. The U.S. Supreme Court has sanctioned the 
notion that judges may look beyond strictly positive sources of law in a 
number of cases.296 And as Justice Cardozo pointed out many years ago, 
many gaps in U.S. common law have been filled by borrowing from 
Roman law or other legal systems.297
 
B.  The United States Constitution as a Floor for Human Rights 
 
Another possibility would be to treat the relationship between 
foreign and international law similarly to the relationship between state 
constitutions and the federal constitution. In the U.S. federalist system, 
the U.S. Constitution provides a floor for the protection of individual 
rights below which states may not go. States may provide more 
protection for individual rights pursuant to their own laws and 
constitutions, but not less. Foreign and international law could be treated 
similarly in that the U.S. Supreme Court could refer to foreign and 
international law standards when they provide a higher level of 
protection than the U.S. Constitution, but would never be forced to adopt 
a foreign or international law standard that is less protective than that of 
the Constitution. In this way, the Supreme Court would be assisting the 
United States in fulfilling its sovereign duty to protect. 
This approach would satisfy the objection that application of foreign 
or international law would lead to the adoption of practices of a country 
with a poor human rights record. However, it still does not answer the 
more difficult questions involving competing human rights, such as those 
of a mother and the potential life represented by a fetus in abortion 
jurisprudence. 
Of course, it also is settled law that “treaties are subject to the 
constitutional limitations that apply to all exercises of federal power, 
principally, the prohibitions of the Bill of Rights.”298 The Treaty Power 
does not extend “so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids.”299 
Taking this proposition together with the Ninth Amendment’s 
admonishment that the people retain rights in addition to those 
enumerated in the Constitution, we see that international law can add to 
the list of individual rights retained by the people and can be used to 
 296. See, e.g., Int’l Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) (resulting in significant 
innovation in the law of unfair competition). 
 297. BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 138, at 353 (citing BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, 
THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 123 (New Haven 1921)). 
 298. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 123, at 137, 254. 
 299. Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890); The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. 616 (1871); 
Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957); Boos v. Barry, 
485 U.S. 312, 324 (1988).
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interpret or give meaning to rights that are enumerated in the 
Constitution, but cannot take away rights enumerated in the Constitution. 
 
C.  International and Foreign Law as an Educational Tool 
 
Several of the Supreme Court justices and scholars have pointed out 
ways in which international and foreign law can be a useful educational 
tool. First, surveying international and foreign legal sources can show 
developing trends in the law. Second, it can suggest new ways of 
approaching common problems.300 Third, it can stimulate thinking about 
different solutions. Fourth, a non-U.S. legal source may suggest a 
persuasive line of logic. Thus, international and foreign legal sources can 
be of tremendous educational value, regardless of whether such sources 
are formally relied upon or cited as any kind of authority for the court’s 
opinion. 
 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
 
Individual rights in the United States are interrelated with the 
developing system of international human rights. Both share a common 
ancestry deriving from natural law principles and political theories of 
sovereignty. A proper understanding of sovereignty recognizes that 
sovereign states have both powers and responsibilities and that the 
primary responsibility of the government is the protection of the people 
who created that government and endowed it with its sovereignty in the 
first place. Thus, governments, including courts, have a duty to take 
international law, including international human rights, into account 
when interpreting national constitutions intended for the protection of the 
people. 
The implications for the United States are that while international 
law does not trump the Constitution, the U.S. Supreme Court should 
consider international law rules in constitutional interpretation whenever 
the political branches of government have adopted international 
agreements or participated in the creation of customary international law 
rules that express the United States’ position on human rights. It also 
should use international law as an interpretive tool to inform its 
 300. For example, in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000), Justice 
Souter compared the U.S. approach to campaign financing to those taken by “other constitutional 
courts facing similar complex problems” and cited to the European Court of Human Rights and the 
Canadian Constitutional Court. Nixon, 528 U.S. at 403. See also United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464, 
468-69 (1995) (Calabresi, C.J., concurring) (“In exercising restraint, American courts might 
nonetheless take note of what the Constitutional Courts of some cognate countries have done in like 
situations.”). 
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understanding of vague or ambiguous constitutional provisions. Under 
the dictates of sovereignty theory, the Court would never be forced to 
adopt a foreign practice that is less protective of the people because that 
would be contrary to the entire purpose for which the government was 
created. Rather, the Supreme Court should continue to use foreign and 
international law to expand our conception of human rights consistently 
with the Constitution and should use international law as an interpretive 
and educational tool in appropriate circumstances as outlined above. 
 
